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In Brazil’s battle against corruption over the past two decades, there has been significant
progress associated with the systems of oversight and investigation but very little progress
in holding corrupt actors legally accountable for their transgressions. We suggest that
until very recently this could be partially explained by the fact that there was institutional
multiplicity (i.e., duplication of functions) in oversight and investigative institutions, while at
the punishment stage, a single and underperforming institution—the judiciary—exercised
monopolistic authority. To circumvent the limits associated with Brazilian courts, the
government is increasingly relying on administrative sanctions for corruption. It is in this
context that Brazil has enacted legislation to punish legal persons for both foreign and
domestic corruption: The Clean Company Act (Lei Anti-Corrupção), enacted in August 2013,
has used institutional multiplicity in an attempt to circumvent the well-known problems that
plague the Brazilian anti-corruption system. We suggest that this approach looks promising,
as it follows the same structure of recent reforms that have been successful in Brazil.
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Dans la lutte du Brésil contre la corruption au cours des deux dernières décennies, des
progrès considérables ont été réalisés en matière de surveillance et d’enquête, mais très
peu pour ce qui est de tenir les fautifs juridiquement responsables de leurs transgressions.
Nous avançons que, jusqu’à tout récemment, cela pouvait s’expliquer en partie par le fait
que de nombreuses institutions surveillaient et enquêtaient, alors qu’une seule – le pouvoir
judiciaire – se réservait sans trop d’efficacité le monopole de la punition. Afin de circonvenir
aux limitations des cours brésiliennes, le gouvernement a de plus en plus recours à des
sanctions administratives pour combattre la corruption. C’est dans ce contexte que le Brésil
a légiféré afin de punir les personnes morales coupables de corruption tant à l’étranger
que sur le territoire national : la loi anticorruption (Lei Anti-Corrupção), promulguEE en août
2013, fait appel à la pluralité des institutions pour tenter de résoudre les problèmes fort
connus qui empoisonnent le système anticorruption du Brésil. Nous sommes d’avis que
cette approche semble prometteuse, car elle possède la même structure que des réformes
qui ont récemment connu du succès au Brésil.
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BRAZIL HAS GRAPPLED WITH CORRUPTION for most of its political history, but

the issue has assumed a particularly prominent position in the country’s politics
since its return to democracy. The democratic constitution enacted in 1988 laid
the groundwork for the development of Brazil’s modern web of accountability
institutions, including in the areas of oversight and investigation.1 Under the
Constitution, the Federal Public Prosecutors’ Office (Ministério Público Federal)
(“MPF”) gained independence from the executive branch, emerging as the
de facto “fourth branch of government,” empowered to act in the defense of
1.

Constituição Da República Federativa Do Brasil De 1988.
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the public interest. The MPF’s role as the primary enforcer of political law
and protector of collective interests was further strengthened under the 1992
Administrative Improbity Law which granted the MPF enhanced authority to act
against corruption and the misuse of public funds.2 The 1988 Constitution also
conferred greater powers and responsibilities to the National Court of Accounts3
(Tribunal de Contas da União) (“TCU”) and guaranteed rights to public
information and freedom of press. These and other institutional reforms have
strengthened the capacity of officials to detect and investigate corrupt activities, as
demonstrated by the many high profile scandals that have been uncovered during
the terms of each of Brazil’s six post-authoritarian presidents. However, while
the discovery and exposure of such numerous incidences of corruption attest to
the competency and effectiveness of the country’s monitoring and investigative
authorities, they also confirm that corruption remains deeply entrenched across
all branches and levels of government in Brazil.
Such endemic corruption has had negative consequences for democracy and
has contributed to the erosion of public trust in Brazilian political institutions.
Power and Taylor report that the Brazilian public’s confidence in politicians
dropped from 31% in 1992 (during the run-up to impeachment of President
Fernando Collor de Melo) to 8% in late 2005, while confidence in political parties
plummeted from 26% to 9% over that same period.4 More recent surveys also
indicate that trust in public institutions remains low and may be deteriorating. In
the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey, for example, Brazilians reported the lowest
levels of support for the political system (37.6%) and the third-lowest levels
of trust in local government (37.1%) among citizens from 28 countries in the
Western Hemisphere.5 The 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer found that Brazil
exhibits the largest gap between trust in business and government among the
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), with only 34% of Brazilians
surveyed expressing confidence in their government compared with 70% who

2.
3.
4.
5.

Rogério B Arantes, “The Federal Police and the Ministério Público” in Timothy J Power &
Matthew M Taylor, eds, Corruption and Democracy in Brazil: The Struggle for Accountability
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011) 184.
Also known as External Court of Accounts or Federal Audit Court.
Timothy J Power & Matthew M Taylor, “Introduction: Accountability Institutions and
Political Corruption in Brazil” in Power & Taylor, eds, supra note 2 at 3 [Power & Taylor,
“Introduction”].
Elizabeth J Zechmeister, ed, The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2014:
Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer (2014) at 191-222.
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trusted business institutions; the report noted that the gap had widened since the
previous year’s survey.6
In addition, strong evidence indicates that the net effect of corruption on the
country’s economic development has been negative.7 While Brazil has experienced
impressive economic growth in recent years,8 studies have estimated that
corruption consumes between 1.4%9 and 5%10 of the country’s GDP, translating
into economic losses of between $31.4 billion USD to $112.3 billion USD each
year. Beyond its adverse impacts on the economy as a whole, corruption imposes
real costs on Brazilian citizens; according to the statistical model used by Silva,
Garcia, and Bandeira, if the level of corruption in Brazil had been as low as that
in Denmark (the least corrupt country in their sample), per worker incomes
would have been 43% higher in 1998, meaning that corruption led to $2,840.81
USD in lost income for the average Brazilian worker that year.11
It is interesting to note that the problem persists despite the existence of
an extensive and robust framework of anti-corruption laws and regulations.
The volume and scope of the laws that comprise Brazil’s anti-corruption
framework are large, including provisions addressing conflicts of interest, public
procurement, access to information, freedom of press and expression, and the
powers and functions of the government Ombudsman.12 Leading anti-corruption
6.

Robert Holdheim, “Trust and the BRICs: Going Nowhere Slowly?”
(23 January 2014), Edelman (blog), online: <www.edelman.com/post/
trust-and-the-brics-going-nowhere-slowly>.
7. Robert Iquiapaza & Hudson Amaral, “Reflections on the Impact of Corruption on
Economic Development: A Literature Review in the Brazilian Economy” (2007), online:
MPRA Paper No. 1818 <mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1818>.
8. Between 2000 and 2013, Brazilian GDP growth ranged from -0.3% (2009) to 7.5%
(2010), with an average annual growth rate of 3.05%. See The World Bank, “Development
Indicators” (2015), online: <databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=NY.GDP.
MKTP.KD.ZG&id=af3ce82b&report_name=Popular_indicators&populartype=ser
ies&ispopular=y>.
9. Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo, “Relatório Corrupção: custos econômicos e
propostas de combate” (2010), online: <www.fiesp.com.br>.
10. Época, “Por que o Brasil pode vencer a corrupção” (22 July 2008), online:
Revista Epoca - Special Debate Supplement <revistaepoca.globo.com/Revista/
Epoca/0,,EDR82402-9306,00.html>.
11. Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves da Silva, Fernando Garcia & Andrea Camara Bandeira,
“How does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors
productivity and per capita income” (2001) at 19, online: Bibliotecadigital <bibliotecadigital.
fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/10438/1953/1/TD103.pdf>.
12. Jeremy Pope, “Transparency International Source Book 2000 - Confronting Corruption:
The Elements of a National Integrity System” (2000), online: <archive.transparency.org/
publications/sourcebook>.
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non-governmental organizations have lauded the country’s anti-corruption
legislative framework and heralded it as a model for other developing countries.13
However, such accolades are generally based on assessments of countries’ formal
anti-corruption policies and the existence of institutions charged with fighting
corruption, rather than evaluations of how these corruption controls function
in reality. The distinction is significant, as there may be sharp divergences
between law on the books and law in action. Indeed, the available evidence from
Brazil suggests that institutional barriers to accountability remain, preserving
opportunities for malfeasance by public officials—particularly in political parties,
the legislature, and local governments.14
Despite these obstacles, empirical and anecdotal evidence indicates that
some progress has been achieved in the battle against corruption in Brazil. In
particular, the institutions charged with investigating suspected corrupt activities
have performed strongly over the past decade. Elsewhere, two of us argue that
the explanation for the success of these government agencies appears to lie, at
least partially, in their institutional arrangements.15 Specifically, we contend
that the overlap of anti-corruption functions among various governmental
entities—“institutional multiplicity”—has strengthened outcomes by allowing
institutions to compete, to collaborate, to complement one another, or to
compensate for one another’s deficiencies or oversights. We assert that the
Brazilian experience reveals the advantages in pursuing alternative institutional

13. Global Integrity, Global Integrity Report: Brazil 2009 (2009); Amarribo Brasil, UN
Convention against Corruption Civil Society Review: Brazil 2012 (2012); Frederick T Stocker,
Anti-Corruption Developments in the BRIC Countries: A MAPI Series (Manufacturers Alliance
for Productivity and Innovation: Arlington, 2012). However, while Brazil is generally
regarded as having a strong legal and institutional anti-corruption framework, some gaps
remain, particularly in the area of whistleblower protections. See e.g. Maíra Martini, “Brazil:
Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption” (2014), online: <http://www.transparency.
org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Brazil_2014.pdf>.
14. See Lindsey Carson & Mariana M Prado, “Mapping Corruption and its Institutional
Determinants in Brazil” (2014) International Research Initiative on Brazil and Africa
Working Paper No 08, online: <http://www.brazil4africa.org/wp-content/uploads/
publications/working_papers/IRIBA_WP08_Mapping_Corruption_and_its_Institutional_
Derminants_in_Brazil.pdf> [Carson & Prado, “Mapping”].
15. Mariana M Prado & Lindsey Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption Legislation and its
Enforcement: Potential Lessons for Institutional Design” (2014) International Research
Initiative on Brazil and Africa Working Paper No 09, online: <http://www.brazil4africa.
org/wp-content/uploads/publications/working_papers/IRIBA_WP09_Brazilian_
Anti-Corruption_Legislation_and_its_Enforcement.pdf> [Prado & Carson, “Brazilian
Anti-Corruption”].
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approaches—including institutional multiplicity combined with institutional
malleability—in developing effective strategies to reduce corruption.
Building on those claims, this article focuses on institutional multiplicity
at the adjudication and punishment stages—specifically, the establishment
or strengthening of administrative and civil sanctions for corruption-related
offences by corporations—and argues that a strategy may confer particularly
valuable benefits in environments where conventional judicial institutions face
severe problems of rigidity and overall inefficiency. Recent political developments
in Brazil strongly suggest that the country’s executive and legislative officials were
cognizant of the potential advantages of such a form of institutional multiplicity
when designing a new punishment system for corporations involved in corruption.
Specifically, the new Brazilian Clean Company Act16 enacted in August 2013 and
in force since January 2014 relies heavily on administrative processes to impose
sanctions on Brazilian companies involved in corruption either in Brazilian
territory or in foreign countries. This reliance on administrative processes and
sanctions creates an alternative way to investigate and punish corporations,
which does not rely uniquely on the judiciary, as explicitly acknowledged in the
justification for the Anti-Corruption Bill presented by the executive branch to the
National Congress:
The present bill opted for administrative and civil liability of legal persons, due to
the fact that Criminal Law does not offer effective and speedy mechanisms to punish
corporations, which are often the ones interested in and benefitting from corrupt
practices. … The administrative process [was chosen], because it has revealed to
be speedy and effective in deterring mismanagement in administrative contracts
and procurement procedures, proving to be more able to provide fast responses to
society.17

As discussed in the academic literature and elsewhere in Part II(B)(3), below,
the Brazilian judiciary represents one of the most significant institutional barriers

16. Law No 12, 846/13 [Clean Company Act]. The statute is known in Portuguese as Lei
Anti-Corrupção. The English language literature generally refers to the statute as the Clean
Company Act, which better captures the fact that the statute is mostly focused on punishing
companies for bribing government officials.
17. Message 52 Executive to National Congress (29 October 2009) EMI No 00011 2009 –
CGU/MJ/AGU, online: <www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra;jsessioni
d=519F1B865607F805 C445F533D460A0DE.proposicoesWeb2?codteor=735505&filenam
e=Tramitacao- PL+6826/2010> [translated by the authors].
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to holding individuals and legal persons accountable for their corrupt activities.18
We hypothesize that by creating an alternative pathway to investigation and
punishment, the new statute has the potential to overcome longstanding barriers
to an effective accountability system for at least one category of corrupt actors:
corporations and other legal entities. If successful in overcoming these barriers,
the Brazilian Clean Company Act could provide insights for other developing
countries struggling with similar issues.
To develop this claim, this article is divided into three parts. Part I provides
a brief history of the Brazilian Clean Company Act and an overview of its
main provisions. Part II analyzes the administrative process for investigation
and punishment in Brazil in greater depth, emphasizing how institutional
multiplicity seems to have strengthened the country’s anti-corruption system.
Building on the institutional multiplicity hypothesis, Part III argues that the
new statute has the potential to effectively bypass the Brazilian judiciary by
relying on administrative and civil processes and sanctions. This is significant
because the judiciary currently represents one of the most important bottlenecks
in the country’s anti-corruption system. We conclude by acknowledging that it
is too early to assess the efficacy of the new Clean Company Act in deterring and
sanctioning corruption. However, we suggest that if our institutional multiplicity
hypothesis proves correct, and the administrative liability regime created by the
Clean Company Act proves effective in holding corrupt companies accountable,
the Brazilian experience may provide a useful example for other countries in the
Global South facing similar constraints.

I. THE BRAZILIAN CLEAN COMPANY ACT
Individuals engaged in corruption in Brazil can be subject to three types of
punishment: administrative, civil, and criminal.19 Each is determined by separate
administrative or judicial processes that run independently of one another.
The Brazilian system to punish individuals involved in corruption schemes is
quite robust, especially for public servants. Until 2013, however, there was no
express legal basis for extending strict liability for corruption-related offences
18. See Part II(B)(3), below. See also, Carlos HR Alencar & Ivo Gico Jr, “When Crime Pays:
Measuring Judicial Performance Against Corruption in Brazil” (2011) 17 Law & Bus Rev
415; Matthew M Taylor, “Veto and Voice in the Courts: Policy Implication of Institutional
Design in the Brazilian Judiciary” (2006) 38:3 Comparative Politics 337; Fausto M Sanctis,
“Recent Legal and Judicial Reform Initiatives in Brazil” (2013) Winter International Judicial
Monitor; Carson & Prado, “Mapping,” supra note 14.
19. Ibid.
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to legal entities, including corporations, whether committed in national or
foreign territory.20 Corporate liability was introduced for the first time in
August 2013, with what became known in Brazil as Lei Anti-Corrupção, or the
Clean Company Act.
A. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FOR LEGAL REFORMS

Brazil’s decision to enact the new Clean Company Act reflects the convergence
of long-standing obligations under international conventions and heightened
attention from national and foreign media and civil society organizations in
the lead-up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. Brazil is a
signatory to three multilateral anti-corruption conventions: the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD
Convention);21 the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, enacted
by the Organization of American States;22 and the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC).23 All three conventions require each state party to
impose liability for corrupt acts on legal entities in a manner “consistent with its
legal principles.”24 Considering that the Brazilian Constitution only authorizes
criminal responsibility of legal persons in cases involving environmental offences,
it would not be possible to impose criminal sanctions for corporations or other
legal persons without a constitutional amendment. Hence, when Brazil revised

20. However, prior to the enactment of Law 12,846, legal persons could potentially be held
administratively liable for foreign bribery under other existing Brazilian laws governing
public procurement, regulating publicly-held companies, and so on. See OECD Working
Group on Bribery, Brazil Phase 2: Report on The Application of The Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997
Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (2007) at 51-53.
21. OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (1998) 37 ILM 1 [OECD Convention] (ratified by Brazil in 2000).
22. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1997) 35
ILM 724 [IACAC] (ratified by Brazil in 2002).
23. United Nations, Convention against Corruption (2004) 43 ILM 37 [UNCAC] (ratified by
Brazil in 2006).
24. OECD Convention, supra note 21, art 2; IACAC, supra note 22, art VIII; UNCAC, supra
note 23, art 26.
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its criminal code in 2002 to include the prohibition on transnational bribery, it
included criminal sanctions only for individuals.25
This gap in Brazilian anti-corruption legislation became especially apparent
in 2010 after the evaluation of Brazil in the second phase of the monitoring
process of the OECD Working Group on Bribery (“OECD Working Group”).
This monitoring process was designed to determine whether a country has
established the structures to enforce the laws and rules that implement the
OECD Convention and to assess their application. In the case of Brazil, the
monitoring team noted multiple deficiencies in the country’s anti-corruption
laws,26 generating momentum and international pressure for a discussion about
Brazil’s international obligations. This opened up the opportunity for the
Executive Branch to send a bill addressing the corporate liability gap to Congress.
B. THE BRAZILIAN CLEAN COMPANY ACT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The Clean Company Act extends civil and administrative liability to corporations
and other legal persons for “acts committed against the domestic or foreign
public administration,” including the bribery of foreign and domestic public
officials, fraud in connection with public procurement activities, and obstruction
of government investigations.27 In this Part, we evaluate the Act against Brazil’s
international obligations under the OECD Convention, UNCAC, and IACAC,
and compare its terms with anti-corruption laws in other states that are party
to one or more of these agreements. As the comparisons reveal, the Brazilian
legislation is fundamentally similar to the anti-corruption laws in a range of
other countries.
However, the effectiveness of law depends not only on its content but
also its enforcement. This potential gap between law on the books and law
in action is addressed explicitly in the design of the OECD Working Group’s
country monitoring system, which assesses the adequacy of both the content
and application of anti-corruption legislation.28 As evidenced by the OECD’s
25. Letter from Jorge Hage Sobrinho, Tarso Genro Fernando Herz & Luis Inácio Lucena
Adams to the President (23 November 2009) EMI No 00011 2009 – CGU/MJ/AGU,
online: <www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/projetos/EXPMOTIV/EMI/2010/11%20%20CGU%20MJ%20AGU.htm> [Interministerial Letter] (arguing for the
approval of the bill).
26. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Brazil Phase 2: Follow-Up Report on the Implementation
of the Phase 2 Recommendations (2010) at 35-41 [OECD Working Group (2010)].
27. Supra note 16, art 5.
28. OECD, “Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention”, online: <www.oecd.
org/daf/anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm>.

116

(2015) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

peer monitoring reports, countries with similar laws may demonstrate enormous
variability in their rates of enforcement of those laws.29 Thus, a doctrinal analysis
and comparison of the content of the new Brazilian legislation can provide
valuable information on the changes the law effects and how its provisions align
or diverge from anti-corruption statutes in other countries. However, the ultimate
effectiveness of the Clean Company Act will largely depend on enforcement,
which will in turn be influenced by institutional multiplicity, as we argue in
Part II, below.
1.

SCOPE OF THE BRIBERY PROHIBITIONS

Brazil’s Clean Company Act prohibits the bribery of both foreign and domestic
public officials. While laws against the bribery of domestic officials have been
common in countries around the world for decades, if not centuries,30 prohibitions
against foreign bribery are a more modern phenomenon. In 1977, the United
States enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),31 the world’s first law
regulating the business conduct of domestic actors engaged in foreign markets
with foreign officials. In December 1997, after decades of advocacy on the part
of American officials and businesses and amid increased attention and pressure
from civil society and the media, members of the OECD and five other countries
(including Brazil) signed the OECD Convention. The Convention, which came
into force in February 1999, requires States Party to establish legally-binding
standards to prohibit foreign bribery. Most signatories to the OECD Convention
have opted to address foreign and domestic bribery in different sections of their
legal codes,32 but Brazil’s unified approach is consistent with anti-bribery laws

29. See e.g. OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions,
Compilation of Recommendations made in the Phase 3 Reports: Implementation and Application
of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions and the 2009 Recommendations on Further Combating Bribery (2014) [OECD
Working Group (2014)]; OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, Compilation of Recommendations made in the Phase 2 Reports (2010).
30. John T Noonan Jr, Bribes: The Intellectual History of a Moral Idea (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987).
31. 15 USC 2012, §§ 78dd-1 et seq [FCPA].
32. Rachel Brewster, “The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention” (2014) 15:1 Chicago J Int’l L 84.

PRADO, CARSON, CORREA, THE BRAZILIAN CLEAN COMPANY ACT 117

in several other States Party, including Colombia, Germany, Portugal, and the
United Kingdom.33
While UNCAC urges signatories to criminalize bribery in the private sector
(commercial bribery) as well as the public sphere,34 the Clean Company Act’s
prohibitions are limited to the bribery of public officials—though the law does
prohibit fraud and manipulation by private companies when bidding on public
contracts.35 Brazil is like many other UNCAC members, including Argentina,
Ecuador, Japan, and Mexico in lacking specific laws that prohibit bribery among
private parties. Moreover, other countries, such as the United States and Australia,
regulate commercial bribery by a patchwork of federal and sub-national laws
rather than a single statute.36
A distinctive feature of the Clean Company Act is the explicit extension of its
prohibitions on bribery to include third parties related to foreign and domestic
public officials.37 While authorities in other jurisdictions have publicly confirmed
that an individual or legal person can be held liable under anti-bribery laws for
advantages improperly conferred on a third party for the eventual benefit of a
public official,38 only a handful of other countries, including Canada and South
Korea, directly address payments made to family members of public officials.39

33. OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Steps Taken by State Parties to Implement
and Enforce the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions” (2014), online: <www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
WGB-Steps-Taken-Update.pdf>.
34. UNCAC, supra note 23, art 21.
35. Clean Company Act, supra note 16, art 5(IV).
36. Sarah Clark, “New Solutions to the Age-Old Problem of Private-Sector Bribery” (2013)
97:6 Minn L Rev 2285; Jones Day, “Anti-Corruption Regulation Survey of Select
Countries” (2014), online: <http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/7c9d704fe85f-4f61-b379-791aa13e9917/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
f42e5f97-71ff-4cea-b597-7a61ef3674b5/Anti-Corruption%20Regulation%20Survey%20
2013%20(optimized).pdf>.
37. Supra note 16, art 5(I).
38. Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the
US Securities and Exchange Commission, “A Resource Guide to the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act” (2012), online: <www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf> [US
Department of Justice, “Resource Guide”].
39. Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 121 [Criminal Code]; Choe Sang-Hun,
“South Korea Tightens Rules Against Gifts to Fight Graft,” New York Times (3 March 2015),
online: <www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/world/asia/south-korea-seeking-to-curb-graft-passeslaw-restricting-gifts.html?_r=0>.
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Another notable feature of the Clean Company Act is its lack of a definition
of “public official” in the text of the law itself.40 The law defines “foreign public
administration” in detail, providing what appears to be a reasonable basis for
extrapolating a general definition of “foreign public official,” but it is silent on
the meaning of “domestic public administration” and thus provides no indication
of which domestic actors fall within the scope of the bribery prohibition.41 The
absence of a definition may present particular challenges in situations involving
state-owned enterprises and other companies over which the government exerts
some control, such as Petrobras, which is embroiled in a large corruption scandal
at the time of writing. In comparison, while ambiguity persists in varying degrees
in the interpretation of the meaning and scope of the term “public official” under
the laws of many other countries such as Canada, the US, and the UK, their
anti-bribery statutes do provide definitions of that term.42
2.

FORMS OF LIABILITY

In accordance with the UNCAC, OECD Convention, and IACAC, Brazil’s
Clean Company Act establishes liability for legal entities, but the liability is
administrative or civil, not criminal. While most signatories to the OECD
Convention (as well as many other countries around the world) have adopted

40. The concept of foreign public official in Brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence is based on
the previously mentioned long-established definition in Article 327 of the Penal Code,
which provides:
For the purposes of criminal law, anyone who, even though temporarily or unpaid, performs
a public job, position or function is deemed to be a public official. Paragraph 1. Anyone
who performs a public job, or holds a function in a para-state body or who works for a
service-providing company hired or contracted to carry out any typical activity in the Public
Administration is also deemed to be a public official.

According to the OECD Phase I Monitoring Report, this definition of “public official”
has been interpreted very broadly by Brazilian courts and doctrine—to cover anyone who
exercises, in any way, a public function. See OECD, Brazil Phase 1: Review of Implementation
of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation (2004) at 5-6.
41. “Foreign public administration” includes any entity directly or indirectly controlled by the
public administration of a foreign state as well as any public international organization.
Brazilian Law 2013, No 12846, arts 5(1)-(3).
42. Bribery Act 2010 (UK), s 6(5); FCPA, supra note 31, §§ 78dd-1(f )(1), 78dd-2(h)(2),
78dd-3(f )(2); 18 USC § 201(a); 18 USC §§ 666 (d)(1)-(4); Corruption of Foreign Public
Officials Act, SC 1998, c 34, s 2 [CFPOA]; Criminal Code, supra note 39, ss 120-23.
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corporate criminal liability for bribery and other corruption-related offences,43
under Brazilian law, legal persons can be only held criminally liable in cases
involving environmental offences.44 However, Brazil’s exemption of corporations
and other legal entities from criminal liability for corruption is consistent with its
domestic legislation and with the approach taken under the anti-corruption laws
of other states party to the OECD Convention (Bulgaria, Colombia, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Russia, and Turkey).45 Moreover, as discussed in Part I(B)(5), below,
by imposing administrative liability on legal persons, the Clean Company Act
allows Brazilian authorities to bring corruption cases in fora separate from the
country’s inefficient judicial system.
Corporate liability for offences under the Clean Company Act is strict,
meaning that a company can be held administratively or civilly liable merely by
showing that its employee, officer, director, or other agent committed a prohibited
act in the company’s interest or for its benefit, without need to prove negligence
or wilful conduct or knowledge on the part of the legal entity.46 Similarly, the
UK Bribery Act imposes strict liability on “relevant commercial organizations”
that fail to prevent individuals “associated with” them from bribing, so long as
there is proof that a bribe was paid with the intention to obtain or retain business
or a business advantage for the organization.47 In contrast, under the bribery
laws of most other countries, including Canada and the US, corporate liability

43. OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Liability of
Legal Persons for Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (2015) at 12 [OECD
Anti-Corruption Network].
44. Brazilian Federal Constitution, art 225 at para 3; Brazilian Law 1998, No 9605.
45. OECD Anti-Corruption Network, supra note 43 at 74. In some countries, such as the US
and Japan, legal persons can be held administratively or civilly liable as well as criminally
liable in foreign bribery cases. See OECD Working Group on Bribery, “2013 Data on
Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention” (2014) at 4-6, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/Working-Group-on-Bribery-Enforcement-Data-2013.pdf>.
46. Supra note 16, art 2. In its most recent assessment of Brazil’s implementation of the OECD
Convention, members of the OECD Working Group on Bribery reported that some of
the anti-corruption officials, prosecutors, and lawyers with whom they spoke during their
consultations and evaluation in Brazil emphasized that the strict liability provided under the
Anti-Corruption Statute would not have been possible under a criminal law, which would
have required proof of fault or intent on the part of the legal person and thus made it more
difficult to hold companies legally responsible for corruption. OECD Working Group
on Bribery, Phase 3 Report On Implementing The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention In Brazil
(2014) at 17 [OECD, Phase 3 Brazil Report].
47. Supra note 42, s 7.
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only attaches if the individuals involved possessed the requisite mens rea.48 In
other jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, authorities face a higher hurdle in
imposing corporate liability, as they must prove that an associated individual
engaged in bribery with the view to induce a public official improperly and that
the legal entity was aware of the transfer as well as the nature or purpose for
which it was given.49
3.

JURISDICTIONAL REACH

The UNCAC, OECD Convention, and IACAC all oblige signatories to take
measures to establish territorial jurisdiction over corruption-related offences and
further urge States Party to extend jurisdiction to offences committed abroad
by their nationals.50 The jurisdictional scope of Brazil’s Clean Company Act goes
beyond these requirements and applies to Brazilian companies (regardless of
corporate structure), foundations, and associations, as well as foreign companies
active in Brazil through branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices, even if
de facto or temporary.51
While most countries exercise jurisdiction over corruption-related offences
more narrowly,52 the extraterritorial reach of the Brazilian law and its broad
application to non-Brazilian companies mirror the provisions of the UK Bribery
Act concerning the “failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery,”
48. The US laws governing both foreign and domestic bribery require proof of corrupt intent.
See FCPA, supra note 31, §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3; 18 USC § 201. The Canadian
bribery law, by contrast, requires that the individual who committed the prohibited act “did
so intentionally or recklessly, with knowledge of the facts constituting the offense, or with
willful blindness toward them.” See R v Sault Ste Marie (City) [1978] 2 SCR 1299, 85 DLR
(3d) 16 [Sault Ste Marie].
49. Bram Meyer, Tessa van Roomen & Eelke Sikkema, “Corporate Criminal Liability for
Corruption Offences and the Due Diligence Defence: A Comparison of the Dutch and
English Legal Frameworks” (2014) 10:3 Utrecht LR 37 at 50.
50. UNCAC, supra note 23, art 42; OECD Convention, supra note 21, art 4; IACAC, supra
note 22, art V.
51. Supra note 16, art 1.
52. For example, while the jurisdictional scope of the FCPA covers US persons—real and legal—
when acting anywhere in the world, with respect to foreign corporations and individuals,
liability only extends to issuers of US securities, or those who make corrupt use of US “mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” or commit any act in furtherance of
bribery or attempted bribery of a foreign official while in US territory. See FCPA, supra note
31, §§ 78dd-1(a), (g), 2(i), 3(a), 78l, 78m(b)(2), 78o(d). Under the CFPOA, non-Canadian
companies can be held liable only under territorial jurisdictional principles, which require
a “real and substantial” connection between the alleged offences and Canada. See CFPOA,
supra note 42. R v Libman [1985] 2 SCR 178, 21 DLR (4th) 174.
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which apply not only to British companies and individuals, but also to foreign
companies that carry on any “part of a business” in the UK.53 Thus, under both
the Brazilian and UK laws, a multinational enterprise that has an office in São
Paulo and London could ostensibly face prosecution in Brazil, the UK, or both,
for bribery that occurred in a different country, even if no act or individual in
Brazil or the UK was involved.
4.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE LIABILITY

Consistent with the terms of the UNCAC, OECD Convention, and IACAC,
under the Clean Company Act, legal persons can be held liable for misconduct
committed by their agents or other intermediaries as well as by their employees,
officers, and directors.54 The Act thus creates strong incentives for corporations to
conduct thorough due diligence on and close scrutiny of any consultants, agents,
or companies that they hire to act on their behalf. Brazil’s comprehensive approach
to corporate liability brings it in line with the laws of most other signatories
to the OECD Convention, although recent reports from the OECD Working
Group note that the application of foreign bribery laws to legal persons who use
intermediaries is incomplete or unsettled in more than a dozen States Party.55
With regard to corporate transactions, the Clean Company Act specifically
states that liability under the law is unaffected by changes in corporate ownership,
although it limits the magnitude of the potential fine in such cases to the amount
of the assets transferred in the merger or acquisition.56 While criminal and civil
successor liability is consistent with general corporate law principles in common
law countries, successor liability in civil law jurisdictions is typically restricted to
civil liability for fines, disgorgement, and similar financial penalties, ordered by
court decision before the merger or acquisition.57
5.

ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURES

Chapter IV of the Clean Company Act lays out a basic framework for administrative
proceedings in cases involving the bribery of domestic officials, but the specific
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Supra note 42, s 7.
Supra note 16, art 5.
OECD Working Group (2014), supra note 29.
Supra note 16, art 4.
Mark Pieth, Lucinda A Low & Nicola Bannucci, The OECD Convention on Bribery: A
Commentary, 2d ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). The Czech Republic
is a notable exception among civil law countries in that its Corporate Criminal Liability Act
provides that “criminal liability of legal persons descends to all its legal successors,” including
for cases involving corruption. See OECD, Phase 3 Brazil Report, supra note 46.

122

(2015) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

procedures for imposing corporate administrative liability are articulated in
Decree No. 8,420,58 which was signed by President Dilma Rousseff on 18 March
2015 and took effect the following day. Pursuant to the Decree, violations of
the Act shall be investigated and adjudicated through an administrative liability
proceeding (Processo Administrativo de Responsabilização) (“PAR proceeding”).
Generally the highest authority of the public entity against which the wrongful
act was allegedly committed will have jurisdiction over the PAR proceeding, but
under certain conditions, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union
(Controladoria-Geral da União) (“CGU”) holds concurrent jurisdiction to
initiate and conduct PAR proceedings. Circumstances under which the CGU
may exercise this discretionary jurisdiction include when: the public entity
lacks objective conditions to conduct the PAR proceeding, the issues involved
are highly complex, the public contracts at issue involve a high amount, or the
situation involves more than one agency or entity of the federal government.59
According to the Clean Company Act, the CGU also has jurisdiction over
administrative enforcement actions involving alleged bribery of foreign officials.
In addition, in both domestic and foreign corruption cases, once an administrative
proceeding is completed, the committee responsible for determining the liability
of the legal entity must give notice to the Public Prosecutors’ Office (Ministério
Público), which can then decide whether to proceed with civil charges.60 The
federal, state, and municipal governments also have the authority to file judicial
actions in relation to alleged violations of the Act.61
By dispersing the authority to hold administrative proceedings across public
entities in cases involving domestic officials, the Act creates the potential risk
of uneven levels of enforcement as well as inconsistent rulings and standards.
In addition, entrusting such proceedings to the highest authority within the
public body involved in the alleged corruption may create troubling conflicts of
interest. However, as discussed in more detail in Part III, below, the concurrent
jurisdictional authority exercised by the CGU alleviates some of these concerns
because the functional institutional multiplicity it creates may facilitate
compensation, collaboration, and competition in administrative proceedings.
Moreover, the ability of the Public Prosecutors’ Office and other government
officials to bring civil charges provides an additional check on possible impunity.

58.
59.
60.
61.

Brazilian Decree 2015, No 8.420.
Ibid, art 13.
Clean Company Act, supra note 16, art 15.
Ibid, art 19.
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The Brazilian approach of allowing corruption-related cases to be brought
and heard in multiple fora is not unique among signatories to the OECD
Convention. For example, in Colombia, legal persons can face administrative
liability in independent proceedings by the central Superintendence of
Corporations or in judicial criminal proceedings against natural persons, as well
as civil liability for damages in the court system.62 Under the Administrative
Offenses Act, which established corporate administrative liability in Germany,
an administrative fine may be imposed against a legal person in cases where a
criminal or administrative forum has found that a member of the management
has committed a corruption-related offence.63
6.

PENALTIES

The potential administrative penalties for violations of the Clean Company
Act include fines, publication of the administrative decision sanctioning the
breaching company in a local or national newspaper, and notices at the corporate
headquarters or on the company’s website. The Act provides that legal entities
can be liable for fines between 0.1% and 20% of the company’s gross revenue,64
and the Decree specifies the minimum and maximum levels for such fines.
The minimum fine is the greater of (1) the benefit sought or obtained by the
company, (2) 0.1% of the company’s gross revenue, and (3) 6,000 Brazilian Real
(“BRL”) (approximately $2096 CAD), if the company’s gross revenues cannot
be determined; and the maximum fine is the lesser of (1) 20% of the company’s
gross revenue, and (2) three times the value of the benefit sought or obtained
by the company.65
Beyond administrative penalties, legal entities also face severe judicial
penalties for violations of the Act, including disgorgement of the benefits
sought or obtained by the illegal act; suspension or partial interruption of the
company’s activities; exclusion from government funding and assistance (e.g.,

62. OECD Working Group, Phase 1 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
in Colombia (2012) at 11-13.
63. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Germany: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report &
Recommendations (2013) at 8 [OECD Working Group (2013)].
64. Supra note 16, art 6.
65. Using her line-item veto power, President Rousseff rejected a provision that would have
limited the amount of the potential fine to the value of the contract or public tender related
to the offense and would thus have provided minimal incentive for parties to refrain from
engaging in bribery.
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subsidies, grants, loans, and donations) for one to five years; and, in extreme
cases, dissolution of the legal entity.66
These corporate penalties are comparable to those provided under the
bribery laws in other signatories to the OECD Convention. For example, under
German law, legal persons face a maximum administrative fine of 10 million
Euro ($14 million CAD).67 Also, under the US FCPA, corporations and other
business entities are subject to a criminal penalty of up to $2 million USD per
violation or twice the pecuniary gain sought in the corrupt transaction as well as a
civil penalty of up to $16,000 USD per violation of the anti-bribery provisions.68
Like Brazil, other countries such as Australia, Greece, Hungary, and Korea all
allow fines to be calculated based on the advantage gained or intended to be
gained through the corrupt act,69 while the UK Bribery Act sets no limits on
potential fines for corporations. In addition, as under the Brazilian law, legal
entities in many jurisdictions also face additional penalties such as confiscation of
the proceeds of bribery or disgorgement of ill-gotten profits,70 as well as collateral
consequences such as the potential suspension or debarment from public
contracting or assistance.71
The Clean Company Act states that when determining penalties, authorities
can consider the seriousness of the offence, the advantage gained or intended
by the offender, whether the offence was fully completed, the degree of damage
or risk of damage, the effects of the offence, the company’s economic strength,
its cooperation with investigating authorities, and the existence of internal
compliance controls.72 The 2015 Decree that complements the Act73 uses these
general criteria to lay out a comprehensive scheme for authorities to calculate
the amount of any fine based on a series of aggravating and mitigating factors.74
66. Supra note 16, art 19.
67. OECD Working Group (2013), supra note 63.
68. FCPA, supra note 31, §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A)-(B), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A)-(B), 78ff(c)(1)(A)-(B);
18 USC § 3571(d).
69. OECD/The World Bank, Identification and Quantification of the Proceeds of Bribery, revised
ed (2012) at 20.
70. Ibid.
71. While debarment is discretionary in countries like the United States and Australia,
conviction under the CFPOA results in mandatory debarment. See Public Works and
Government Services Canada, Ineligibility and Suspension Policy (Ottawa: Public Works,
2015) Part C, ss 3(e), 5(e). See also Stuart H Deming, Anti-Bribery Laws in Common Law
Jurisdictions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 12.
72. Supra note 16, art 6(6).
73. Brazilian Decree 2015, No 8.420, supra note 58.
74. Ibid.
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It further establishes that the specific factors that can be applied to a given case
must be determined during the administrative proceeding.75
The Clean Company Act also allows authorities to conclude “leniency
agreements” with companies accused of misconduct as a means to mitigate
potential sanctions.76 Under the Act and the Decree, entry into a leniency
agreement requires a company to cooperate and collaborate “effectively” with
the investigation and any administrative proceeding, including identifying the
involved parties and expeditiously providing information, documents, and
other evidence substantiating the misconduct to the government.77 The Act and
Decree further specify that the CGU may execute leniency agreements relating
to violations at the federal level or involving foreign governments. Performance
under the terms of a leniency agreement may have one or more of the following
benefits for a firm: exemption from publication of the administrative decision
sanctioning its misconduct; exemption from the prohibition on receiving public
funding and assistance; up to a two-thirds reduction of the fine imposed; and
exemption from or mitigation of administrative sanctions set out in certain
statutes governing public tenders and government contracts.78
Most countries join Brazil in allowing officials to take aggravating and
mitigating factors, including a company’s willingness to cooperate with
enforcement authorities, into consideration when determining the level of fines
or other sanctions to be imposed in corruption cases.79 In addition, jurisdictions
75.
76.
77.
78.

Ibid at art 20.
Supra note 16, art 16.
Ibid, art 16; Brazilian Decree 2015, No 8.420, supra note 58, art 28.
See Brazilian Decree 2015, No 8.420, supra note 58 at art 40:
Once the leniency agreement has been signed by the cooperative legal person, one or more
of the following effects will be declared in favor of the signing legal person: I - exemption of
the extraordinary publication of the sanctioning administrative decision; II - exemption from
the ban to receiving incentives, subsidies, grants, donations or government loans from public
entities and from public financial institutions or from those controlled by the Government;
III - reduction of the final amount of the financial penalty, subject to the provisions in art. 23;
or IV - exemption or reduction of the administrative penalties defined in art. 86 to Art. 88 of
Law N. 8666, 1993, or in other norms of procurement and contracts.

The effects of the leniency agreement will be extended to the legal persons who are part of
the same economic group, in fact and in law, provided that they have signed the agreement
together, respected the conditions established on it.
79. OECD Anti-Corruption Network, supra note 43; Ministry of Justice, “The Bribery Act
2010: Guidance” (2011) at 8; US Department of Justice, “Resource Guide,” supra note 39 at
52-53; Her Majesty the Queen v Griffiths Energy International, [2013] AJ No 412 (Transcript
of Proceedings).
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such as the UK and US allow prosecutors to reach negotiated resolutions with legal
and natural persons accused of misconduct that serve a purpose similar to that
of Brazil’s leniency agreements. These agreements, called deferred-prosecution
agreements or non-prosecution agreements, generally require the defendant to
agree to pay a monetary penalty, cooperate with authorities, admit the relevant
facts, and take specified compliance and remediation measures; in exchange, the
government agrees to delay or withdraw criminal charges.80

II. USING INSTITUTIONAL MULTIPLICITY TO FIGHT
CORRUPTION IN BRAZIL
While ex ante mechanisms are intended to prevent or deter actors from engaging
in corruption before it takes place, a system of accountability operates ex post,
i.e., only after the corrupt act has occurred. An effective system of accountability
requires a “web” of effective institutions that will increase the likelihood that
those who engage in corrupt activities will be caught and punished.81 In this
regard, these institutions should perform three primary functions: first, oversight,
which entails monitoring those in positions of power or engaged in activities
carrying a high risk of corruption to identify quickly anything suspicious or
atypical; second, investigation, which is the process of obtaining more detailed
information about acts or activities once suspicion has been raised; and third,
punishment, which is the effective application of sanctions in those cases in
which there is sufficient evidence to prove misconduct.82
Brazil possesses an extensive stock of anti-corruption legislation. It also boasts
a wealth of accountability institutions charged with monitoring, investigating,
and sanctioning those involved in corruption.83 The numerous investigations
that have uncovered corruption schemes at different levels of the government
over the past decade provide evidence of the strong performance of the country’s
systems of oversight and investigation. There has also been progress in the system
of administrative sanctions, although, as discussed in detail in Part II(B), below,

80. See e.g. US Department of Justice, “Resource Guide,” supra note 38; Crime and Courts Act
2013 (UK), Schedule 17 at s 45.
81. Pope, supra note 12; Scott Mainwaring & Christoper Welna, eds, Democratic Accountability
in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
82. Matthew M Taylor & Vinícius C Buranelli, “Ending Up in Pizza: Accountability as a
Problem of Institutional Arrangement in Brazil” (2007) 49:1 Latin Am Pol & Soc’y 59;
Power & Taylor, “Introduction,” supra note 4.
83. Stocker, supra note 13; Carson & Prado, “Mapping,” supra note 14.
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the judiciary remains a core weakness in Brazil’s accountability system.84 We have
hypothesized that such progress can be partially explained by the duplication of
oversight, investigative, and punishment functions among various governmental
entities, which we label “institutional multiplicity.”85 Largely relying on previous
work that has been done on this concept, this article explores the instances of
institutional multiplicity in Brazil’s systems of corruption oversight (the TCU
and CGU), investigation (Public Ministry, Federal Police Department, and
the CGU), and punishment (the CGU, the National Audit Court, and the
Brazilian judiciary).
The Brazilian experience suggests that functional institutional overlaps allow
for compensation, collaboration, and competition among various governmental
entities and seem to have played a role in bolstering anti-corruption efforts in
Brazil. Thus, the country’s experience suggests that institutional multiplicity
may provide advantages in combatting a complex governance challenge like
corruption, especially in a context where the accountability system as a whole
suffers from inefficiency, ineffectiveness, or other flaws.
A. WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL MULTIPLICITY?

The concept of institutional multiplicity has been used by different scholars
to refer to different phenomena. For instance, a significant portion of the
political science literature has used the concept in connection with analyses of
the mechanisms, patterns, and processes of institutional change and stability.86
84. Leonardo Avritzer, “O real combate à corrupção,” Carta Capital (3 September 2011),
online: <www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/combate-a-corrupcao-e-programa-de-governo>;
Fernando Filgueiras, “Transparência e controle da corrupção no Brasil” in Leonardo
Avritzer & Fernando Filgueiras, eds, Corrupção e sistema político no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro:
Civilização Brasileira, 2011) 133; Matthew M Taylor, “Corruption, Accountability Reforms,
and Democracy in Brazil” in Charles H Blake & Stephen D Morris, eds, Corruption and
Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009) 150.
85. For an analysis of the recent progress, see Bruno W Speck, “Auditing Institutions” in
Timothy J Power & Matthew M Taylor, eds, Corruption and Democracy in Brazil: The
Struggle for Accountability (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011) 127;
Arantes, supra note 2. Prado and Carson have analyzed the concept of institutional
multiplicity in the context of anti-corruption legislation. See Prado & Carson, “Brazilian
Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15.
86. Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany,
Britain, the United States, and Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); James
Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen,
Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
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Many sociologists, in contrast, have relied on the concept to analyze heterogeneity
in models of action, especially in processes that culminate in the loss of social
order or growth of social entropy.87 While political scientists aim to explain change
in formal rules and in organizations, sociologists tend to focus on explaining
behavioural and social change. The concept of institutional multiplicity used in
this article is closer to the sociological viewpoint for two reasons.
First, economists and political scientists have often adopted the widely
popular definition of institutions provided by Douglass C. North:
Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, the humanly
devised constraints that structure human interactions. They are composed of formal
rules (statute law, common law, regulation), informal constraints (conventions,
norms of behaviour, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement
characteristics of both.88

However, as Michael J. Trebilcock and Mariana Mota Prado have argued,
this definition of institutions generally strikes lawyers and legal scholars as odd
and overly broad:
[T]he legally prescribed speed limit on a given highway is not considered to be an
institution but rather a legal rule promulgated by one set of institutions, enforced
by another, and in the event of disputes, adjudicated by yet another. Moreover,
by including informal constraints (cultural conventions, norms of behaviour, and
self-imposed codes of conduct) in this definition of institutions, the concept of
institutions becomes so all-encompassing that it includes almost any conceivable
factor that may influence human behaviour and hence risks losing any operational
content.89

A definition of institutions that may be more attractive to lawyers is “those
organizations (formal and informal) that are charged or entrusted by a society
with making, administering, enforcing, or adjudicating its laws or policies.”90
This is the definition adopted by organizational and economic sociologists and is
endorsed in this article.91
87. Elizabeth S Clemens & James M Cook, “Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability
and Change” (1999) 25 Ann Rev Soc 441.
88. Douglass C North, “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development” in
John Hariss, Janet Hunter & Colin M Lewis, eds, The New Institutional Economics and Third
World Development (London: Routledge, 1995) 17 at 23.
89. Michael J Trebilcock & Mariana Mota Prado, Advanced Introduction to Law and Development
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014) 32 at 34.
90. Michael J Trebilcock & Mariana Mota Prado, What Makes Poor Countries Poor? Institutional
Determinants of Development (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) at 27-28.
91. Clemens & Cook, supra note 87 at 442.
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Second, this article explores the possibility that the existence of more than
one institutional option may change individuals’ choices and behaviours. Thus,
rather than explaining why there have been such significant institutional and
legal reforms in the Brazilian anti-corruption system in recent years (such as
the creation of the Office of the Comptroller General and the strengthening
of the Federal Police),92 our analysis focuses on the potential for behavioural
change in environments in which institutional and legal changes have already
taken place. As Elizabeth S. Clemens and James M. Cook explain, a lack of
institutional alternatives can generate regularities of social action, which are then
taken for granted.93 In the Brazilian case, such established patterns include the
expectation that efforts against corruption will not succeed and that individuals
and companies, especially those in positions of power, will continue to engage
in corrupt activities with impunity. In this context, the creation or existence of
alternative institutional paths to hold corrupt actors accountable can generate
contradictions that destabilize these existing regularities of action.94 More
specifically, institutional multiplicity has the potential to generate an external
contradiction, i.e., the behavioural regularities observed in one institution are
challenged by contradictory behavioural patterns followed by another institution.
For example, individuals in one accountability institution with a history
of inaction or ineffectiveness may be unable to change their behaviour in that
context, but a new institution may not set up the constraints that existed in
the old one. The new institution can create space for effective accountability by
creating different incentives and operating under a different culture. The impact
of this new institution can be even more drastic—once those in the old and
inefficient institution start to observe their counterparts in another institution
proactively investigating or prosecuting corruption, they may begin to question
their negative assumptions about their own institution’s potential role in
combatting corruption.
While the concept of institutional multiplicity used in this article is closer to
the one often adopted in the sociological literature, it does not fully overlap with
it. Specifically, this article looks beyond those factors identified in the sociological
92. For an article focused on this, see Sérgio Praça & Matthew M Taylor, “Inching Toward
Accountability: The Evolution of Brazil’s Anticorruption Institutions, 1985–2010” (2014)
56:2 Latin Am Pol & Soc’y 27.
93. Supra note 87 at 446.
94. See Myeong-Gu Seo & WE Douglas Creed, “Institutional Contradictions, Praxis, and
Institutional Change: A Dialectical Perspective” (2002) 27:2 Academy Mgmt Rev 222;
Tammar B Zilber, “Institutional Multiplicity in Practice: A Tale of Two High-Tech
Conferences in Israel” (2011) 22:6 Org Sci 1539.
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literature in order to embrace a wide array of potential causal explanations as
to how institutional multiplicity can generate change. As discussed by Clemens
and Cook, two potential mechanisms can effect change in behavioural patterns:
socialization and institutional incentives. Both have significant power in
explaining observed changes, as illustrated by the following analogy:
If a mouse repeatedly takes the same path across a table, this regular path may be due
to either the presence of a maze that obstructs many possible changes in direction
or to effective socialization through behaviour modification. However, since the
mouse may be well socialized and in a maze, these “institutionalisms” are properly
understood as complements, rather than mutually exclusive explanations.95

Thus, while the focus of our analysis is on the creation of formal institutions
that offer alternative paths and how this new “maze” may modify behaviour, we
do not dismiss the possibility that the causal mechanism that allows changes to
take place in such alternative institutional pathways may also include informal
mechanisms, such as socialization of actors in a different institutional culture.
While the causal mechanisms that explain behavioural change may be quite
distinct for economists, political scientists, and sociologists, these disciplines
share a generally consistent approach to explaining why there is lack of change
in many circumstances. As described by path dependence theory,96 once an
institution has been established, various feedback effects and self-reinforcing
mechanisms make it increasingly more costly and difficult to enact serious reform
(or eliminate the institution entirely), even when institutional performance is
sub-optimal. Institutions and institutional arrangements often foster increasing
returns, such that the benefits of maintaining the status quo—and the relative
costs associated with pursuing alternatives—grow over time as more and more
people become invested in the existing framework. Cognizant of these obstacles to
change, so-called historical institutionalists frequently characterize institutional
evolution as a process “characterized by relatively long periods of path-dependent
institutional stability and reproduction that are punctuated occasionally by brief
phases of institutional flux—referred to as critical junctures—during which more

95. Clemens & Cook, supra note 87 at 446 [emphasis in original].
96. For a review of the political science literature on path dependency, see Paul Pierson,
“Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics” (2000) 94:2 Am Pol Sc
Rev 251 at 252-57. See also Mariana Prado & Michael Trebilcock, “Path Dependence,
Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform” (2009) 59:3 UTLJ 341; W Brian
Arthur, “Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy” (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1994).
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dramatic change is possible.”97 However, the literature on institutional change
has increasingly challenged this dualist view of institutional development,
emphasizing instead that institutional transformation is often incremental.98
The idea that institutional and behavioural change is associated with
multiple institutional pathways is captured by a number of different concepts in
the literature. So-called institutional “layering”99 describes a process of gradual
institutional change that occurs as the result of introducing new rules or creating
new organizations without eliminating existing ones. Closely related to the
concept of institutional layering, and partially overlapping with it, is the concept
of institutional bypass.100 An institutional bypass has three characteristics: First, it
keeps the traditional institution in place; second, it creates an alternative pathway
through which to deliver government services or discharge governmental functions;
and third, its creators intend it to be more efficient or functionally effective than
the traditional institution.101 Bypasses are a specific type of layering. For example,
while layering includes the introduction of new rules that fundamentally change
the way existing institutions work,102 institutional bypass is limited to situations
in which newly-established institutions operate independently of, and parallel
to, pre-existing institutions, while performing essentially the same functions.103
While institutional multiplicity is not necessarily the same as layering
or bypass, it shares some important characteristics with both. The idea of
institutional multiplicity is broad enough to embrace the cases of layering in
97. Giovanni Capoccia & R Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory,
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism” (2007) 59:3 Wld
Pol 341 at 341.
98. See e.g. Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 86 at 1-37; Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism:
Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001) at 252-54; Streeck & Thelen, supra note 86 at 1-39.
99. Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 86 at 35-37.
100. Graham Denyer Willis & Mariana Mota Prado, “Process and Pattern in Institutional
Reforms: A Case Study of the Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) in Brazil” (2014) 64 World
Dev 232 at 235.
101. Mariana Mota Prado, “Institutional Bypass: An Alternative for Development Reform”
(2011), online: <ssrn.com/abstract=1815442>.
102. Schickler, supra note 98 at 16. Schickler is describing how the superimposition of new
budget committees on a decades-old structure of authorization, appropriations, and revenue
committees in the US Congress altered the process of developing fiscal policy.
103. Willis and Prado discuss the distinction between institutional bypass and institutional
layering. See Willis & Prado, supra note 100 at 235. See also Thelen, supra note 86 at 39-91.
Thelen details how the establishment of an alternate accreditation committee by Germany’s
machine industry bypassed the pre-existing handicraft chambers without directly changing
the rules or operation of that organization.
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which the changes happen through the creation of a new institution as well
as cases of bypasses. However, not all cases of institutional multiplicity can be
described as layering or bypass. Layering, on the one hand, comprises “a partial
renegotiation of elements of a given set of institutions while leaving others
in place.”104 An example of layering in the Brazilian context is the creation of
specialized benches (varas especializadas) to hear money-laundering cases. The
initiative was implemented as an option for federal tribunals in 2003,105 and
after showing significant results, these specialized benches became mandatory for
federal appeals tribunals in 2013.106 This is a case of layering because it adds a
new element into the system, but prosecutors still cannot choose in which forum
their cases will be heard. An example of bypass, on the other hand, can be found
in Indonesia where prosecutors have the option of bringing corruption-related
cases in conventional courts or in specialized anti-corruption courts that operate
in parallel.107 These courts offer a bypass because they create a choice of forum for
prosecutors. In the context of accountability systems more broadly, institutional
multiplicity embraces any diversification of functions, such as the common
existence of multiple forms and layers of punishment options that reinforce each
other. For example, in cases involving political corruption, offenders may face a
series of overlapping penalties, including electoral sanctions from the public at
the ballot box, political sanctions such as censure or administrative removal from
office, and negative media coverage, as well as formal legal sanctions, such as
criminal or civil judgments.108
104. Kathleen Thelen, “The Political Economy of Business and Labor in the Developed
Democracies” in Ira Katznelson & Helen V Milner, eds, Political Science: The State of the
Discipline (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2002) 371.
105. Conselho da Justiça Federal, 24 October 2014, (2014), Lex Magister 126, No 314 (Brazil);
Conselho da Justiça Federal, 30 June 2006, (2006), Tribunal Regional Federal 111,
No 517 (Brazil).
106. Conselho da Justiça Federal, 18 December 2013, (2014), Official Gazette, 159,
No 273 (Brazil).
107. Simon Butt, “Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Drive and the Constitutional Court” (2009)
4:2 J Comp L 186 at 186; Sofie Arjon Schütte, “Appointing Top Officials in a Democratic
Indonesia: The Corruption Eradication Commission” (2011) 47:3 Bull Indonesian Econ
Stud 355; Sofie Arjon Schütte, “Against the Odds: Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia”
(2012) 32 Pub Admin & Dev 38. While the Indonesian Supreme Court recently declared
the anti-corruption judiciary unconstitutional, after a few reforms, the specialized courts
are now operational again. Simon Butt, “Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia: An
Obituary?” (2011) 47:3 Bull Indonesian Econ Stud 381; Sofie Arjon Schütte & Simon
Butt, “The Indonesian Court for Corruption Crimes: Circumventing Judicial Impropriety?”
(2013) 5 U4 Brief.
108. Power & Taylor, “Introduction,” supra note 4 at 14.

PRADO, CARSON, CORREA, THE BRAZILIAN CLEAN COMPANY ACT 133

Returning to the specific example of Brazil’s Clean Company Act, the creation
of accountability processes that can culminate in administrative sanctions for
legal entities that have engaged in corruption is a case of multiplicity that is
neither layering or bypass. As in cases involving layering and bypass, the
establishment of administrative processes and sanctions do not affect the existing
sanctioning institution—the judiciary. Similar to electoral or political sanctions,
the administrative sanction is complementary to and independent of the judicial
sanction. However, it is subordinated to judicial scrutiny. Thus, unlike the
examples of layering and bypass, the new administrative system does not provide a
functional equivalent to the existing judicial system of punishment. Nevertheless,
as we argue in Part III, below, this new approach to sanctioning corrupt entities
has the potential to overcome obstacles in the existing accountability system.
Despite the differences among the concepts of institutional multiplicity,
layering, and bypass, all three arrangements have advantages in overcoming
entrenched barriers to institutional change. The establishment of an alternative
institution communicates to parties both within and outside the pre-existing
institution that the status quo is not inevitable or necessarily interminable.109 It
thus introduces the possibility of a new institutional framework that may lead to
stronger performance and outcomes. Moreover, outright and abrupt institutional
displacement of one institution by a new one may generate intense opposition
from constituencies invested in (or benefitting from) the current framework.
Institutional layering, bypass, and multiplicity can create displacement over
time and in the long term, but in the short term they leave existing institutions
intact and merely provide alternative paths for achieving the same or similar
objectives.110 For this reason, these three arrangements may ignite less direct
antagonism.111 Finally, the presence of multiple institutional referents “enlarges

109. See Zilber, supra note 94 at 1540.
110. See Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 86 at 16. Mahoney and Thelen describe slow-moving
displacement [emphasis in original]:
[D]isplacement is present when existing rules are replaced by new ones. This kind of change
may well be abrupt, and it may entail the radical shift that is often featured in leading
institutional theories… Yet displacement can also be a slow-moving process. This may occur
when new institutions are introduced and directly compete (rather than supplement) an older
set of institutions.

111. See Schickler, supra note 98 at 252.
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the toolbox from which reformers can draw in crafting new solutions, facilitating
deeper change.”112
Broadly, institutional multiplicity can combat corruption by limiting
opportunities for corruption (proactive institutional multiplicity) or by
increasing the likelihood of catching and sanctioning corrupt behaviour (reactive
institutional multiplicity). Examples of proactive institutional multiplicity
include the elimination of monopolies in the provision of services. For example,
Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that rather than entrusting a single official
with the power and discretion to issue a given licence or provide another service,
multiple officials should be granted such authority so that a private party who
is solicited for a bribe by one agent can simply turn to another to secure the
service honestly.113 While intuitively compelling, this strategy is subject to several
drawbacks and qualifications. First, there is a risk of unintended consequences:
While competing jurisdiction may decrease bribes, the amount of total theft from
the government may increase.114 Second, institutional competition can create
more opportunities for corruption: If I want to obtain a licence for which I do
not qualify, having two officials to approach with a bribe, rather than one, may
increase the chances that I will be successful. Third, implementing an effective
system of institutional multiplicity depends on the possibility of establishing
competing jurisdictions, which may not be possible due to limited resources or
the type of service delivered. Fourth, effective institutional multiplicity requires
the creation and cultivation of an institutional structure in which competition
creates incentives to improve performance; if institutional multiplicity merely
facilitates shirking by one or more employees or agencies, it will be ineffective in
helping to curtail corruption and may simply waste resources.115
Institutional multiplicity as a reactive tool for combatting corruption
involves generating alternative avenues through which authorities may monitor,
investigate, and punish corruption. When it is possible for multiple institutions
to independently monitor, investigate, and pursue administrative, civil, and
112. Matt Andrews, The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic
Solutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 182, citing Elinor Ostrom,
“Design Principles of Robust Property-Rights Institutions: What Have We Learned?” in
Gregory K Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong, eds, Property Rights and Land Policies (Cambridge,
Mass: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009) 25.
113. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York:
Academic Press, 1978).
114. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny, “Corruption” (1993) 108:3 QJ Econ 599.
115. Pranab Bardhan, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues” (1997) 35:3
J Econ Lit 1320.
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criminal charges based on suspicions or detected irregularities, the likelihood that
those engaged in corruption will be held accountable will rise. The assumption
is that institutional overlap can enhance the overall effectiveness of the “web” of
accountability institutions by avoiding self-reinforcing mechanisms or corrupt
institutional cultures and by fostering institutional competition.116
Institutional multiplicity as a reactive tool has a number of potential benefits.
First, it arguably fosters competition to improve institutional efficiency.117 This
idea is present in the broader rule of law literature. For example, Thomas Heller
has recommended institutional multiplicity as a strategy to overcome obstacles
to rule of law reforms in developing countries.118 Effective change in established
organizations, Heller argues, can only come about when organizations are
motivated by incentives that come with competition. Heller also argues that
where multiple legal organizations have non-exclusive jurisdiction, the ability
of the incumbent institution to resist change is reduced. Applied to the issue
of corruption, competition can create pressure for organizations to address
those obstacles that hamper their ability to combat corrupt activity effectively.
Second, institutional overlap can serve a gap-filling function in instances when
institutions fail to perform their duties to investigate and punish corrupt
activity.119 Corruption is a complex, secretive activity and therefore presents
unique challenges to investigative officials. As such, functional overlap may
be the best mechanism to ensure that corruption, whether entrenched or
opportunistic, is ultimately exposed. Institutional multiplicity could reduce
the risk of failures at each step of the corruption accountability process. Third,
institutional multiplicity could result in collaboration and complementarity.120
To the extent that institutional multiplicity means that more human, financial,
and other resources are mobilized to fight corruption, enforcement may improve.
Alternatively, cooperation between institutions could result in specialization,
where different institutions contribute different and complementary skills to
perform a particular task, improving overall effectiveness in tackling corruption.
These advantages suggest that institutional multiplicity may, in some instances,
be an effective strategy for combatting corruption.

116. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15.
117. Ibid.
118. Thomas C Heller, “An Immodest Postscript” in Erik G Jensen & Thomas C Heller, eds,
Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003) 382.
119. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15.
120. Ibid.
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While reactive institutional multiplicity can offer benefits, it also has a
number of potential drawbacks. First, because institutional overlap implies
duplication it can sometimes be an inefficient allocation of resources, especially
in the short term. This concern is particularly relevant in low-income developing
countries with scarce fiscal resources—countries that struggle to provide adequate
coverage for other societal needs, such as education and health. Second, in some
contexts institutional multiplicity may engender destructive competition and
encourage individuals in one institution to act in a manner that undermines the
efforts of their counterparts in another institution. Third, insofar as institutional
multiplicity increases the number of officials with the power to investigate
and punish corruption, there may be an increased incidence of corruption in
the processes of holding individuals accountable for corruption. For example,
institutional multiplicity may increase the number of authorities from multiple
(corrupt) investigation institutions who are able to extract bribes by threatening
innocent citizens with false charges. We acknowledge these limitations, which
should be considered in a careful cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account resources, capacities, and policy needs within individual
countries or societies. As such, a strategy of institutional multiplicity should
be undertaken only after careful consideration of the potential benefits and
drawbacks, based on the specific context.
B. INSTITUTIONAL MULTIPLICITY IN BRAZIL

Since 2005, there have been a considerable number of high profile and widely
publicized anti-corruption operations in Brazil. These operations typically
involve the execution of arrest or search warrants, and participation by the Public
Prosecutors’ Office (Ministério Público) or other bodies such as the Revenue
Service, the Social Security Ministry, the state police, and regulatory agencies.121
In addition to these criminal and civil investigations, there have also been a
number of administrative investigations, including those related to the various

121. Arantes, supra note 2 at 200.
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audits regularly conducted by the CGU.122 This heightened activity by Brazilian
authorities in the realm of corruption over the past decade has been particularly
notable given its contrast to the previous weakness and paucity of anti-corruption
initiatives in the country. What could explain such apparently significant changes
in the system, and what lessons can be learned from them?
While increases in the number of investigations could be interpreted as
evidence that corruption spiked dramatically over that period, the specialized
literature has suggested that the escalations may reflect changes in Brazilian
anti-corruption institutions’ capacity, resources, policies, or procedures.123
Similarly, the higher number of investigations by the Public Prosecutors’ Office
may reveal “more on the traits of how the Criminal Code is applied than on the
crime in question.”124 Nevertheless, Prado and Carson argue that institutional
multiplicity may at least partially explain why the Brazilian federal government’s
accountability system has demonstrated strong vitality, especially in monitoring
and investigating corruption.125
1.

INSTITUTIONAL MULTIPLICITY IN OVERSIGHT

At the federal level, a multitude of institutions perform constant monitoring of the
Brazilian government, but our analysis focuses on two core oversight institutions:
the TCU and the CGU. As the external oversight body for the legislative and
executive branches, the TCU possesses institutional guarantees of autonomy
122. Internal auditing of the Brazilian federal administration is highly centralized in the CGU,
although every public body has an Internal Audit Advisor. State-owned and mixed-capital
enterprises have their own internal audit functions. The CGU performs an extensive range
of different audits, e.g. performance audits, financial audits, audits to assess performance of
subnational delivery of federal programs, and investigative audits. According to the OECD:
During 2008, over 3,200 complaints or requests for investigations were received, of which
nearly 2,500 were audited. The gap between the number of complaints received and those that
are addressed (25%) was due, in many cases, to a lack of data or consistency of the information
provided through a preliminary review of information. Some 900 inspections were completed
in 2008, spanning 348 municipalities and involving a number of federal programmes within,
among others, the Federal Ministries of Cities, Health, Education, Social Development and
Fight against Hunger.

See OECD Public Governance Reviews, Integrity Review of Brazil: Managing Risks for a
Cleaner Public Service (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012) at 203.
123. Praça & Taylor, supra note 92
124. Bruno W Speck, “Mensurando a Corrupção: Uma Revisão de Dados Provenientes de
Pesquisas Empíricas” in Os Custos da Corrupção, Cadernos Adenauer 10 (São Paulo: Fundção
Konrad Adenauer, 2000) at 11.
125. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15.
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akin to an independent central bank or an independent regulatory agency. As
part of its oversight and monitoring activities, the TCU assists Congress in the
preparation and execution of the federal budget, inspects annual financial reports
from all offices of the public administration, and approves the hiring, retirement,
and pension policies for all civil servants.126 Each year, the TCU’s staff of 2,400
people inspects roughly 3,000 annual financial reports from various government
offices, and processes several thousands of cases involving the employment and
retirement of civil servants.127
The CGU is part of the executive branch of government. Despite being
responsible for internal accountability within the executive branch, the CGU
can be considered an instrument of horizontal accountability.128 Notable
among its functions is its program to audit the use and management of federal
transfers by municipalities. Brazil has over 5,000 municipalities and the CGU
does not have resources to audit all of them. It audits all municipalities with
a population under 500,000 and conducts a lottery twice a year to select a
random sample of smaller municipalities for auditing.129 It audits on average 60
smaller municipalities per lottery via this Random Audits Program (Programa de
Fiscalização a partir de Sorteios Públicos).130 Studies indicate that such audits have
been effective in reducing corruption at the local level (especially with regard
to education and health), and reducing the likelihood that corrupt mayors are

126. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988, art 7, I-III, online: <http://english.
tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-constitution>.
127. Speck, supra note 85 at 137; Marcus A. Melo, “Brazil: Democracy and Corruption”
(Working paper delivered at the Democracy Works Project seminar, Rio de Janeiro, Legatum
Institute, 15 May 2013) [unpublished] at 21 [Melo].
128. Cecilia Olivieri, “O Controle Interno Como Instrumento de Accountability Horizontal:
Uma Análise Exploratória da Controladoria Geral da União” (Paper delivered at the
Meeting of Public Administration and Governance, November 2006), Encontro de
Administração Pública e Governança, online: <www.admsp20061.wikispaces.com/
file/view/O+Controle+Interno+como+Instrumento+de+Accountability+Horizontal++Cec%C3%ADlia+Olivieri.pdf>.
129. Melo, supra note 127 at 23.
130. For a description of the Random Audits Program, see Claudio Ferraz & Frederico
Finan, “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits
on Electoral Outcomes” (2008) 123:2 Q J Econ 703 [Ferraz & Finan, “Exposing”];
Controladoria-Geral da União, “Sorteios Públicos” (2014), Presidência Da República, online:
</www.cgu.gov.br/assuntos/auditoria-e-fiscalizacao/avaliacao-de-programas-de-governo/
programa-de-fiscalizacao-em-entes-federativos/sorteios-publicos>.
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re-elected.131 Another important initiative is the Observatory of Public Expenses
(Observatório de Despesa Pública),132 which develops technology to constantly
evaluate patterns in public expenditures at the federal level. The initiative has
received multiple international awards, including the United Nations Public
Service Award in 2011.133 The CGU’s Directorate of Strategic Information also
conducts a less publicly visible monitoring program that cross-checks data in
publicly available databases in search of evidence of misuse or misappropriation
of federal government funds.134 The institutional multiplicity created by the
coexistence of these two separate monitoring authorities appears to have helped
to redress some of the internal weaknesses of each organization—especially the
TCU—and to improve general oversight within the country.
Three characteristics of the TCU undermine its efficacy in fighting corruption,
despite it being formally touted as an archetypical auditing institution.135 Firstly,
TCU officials spend most of their time on routine monitoring tasks such as
preparing audit statements of the government’s annual accounts, reviewing
annual financial reports from all units of government that manage public funds,
and approving policies related to civil servants’ employment and retirement,
rather than detecting irregularities or systematically analyzing areas in which
there are greater risks of corruption.136 Secondly, the TCU’s governance structure
is perceived to be dysfunctional. Despite being independent from Congress
and relying on a cadre of highly qualified and professional civil servants, the
top echelon of politically appointed and organizationally powerful ministers
has strong incentives to block politically sensitive issues and topics.137 Thus, as
illustrated by a labour court case known as the “TRT case,” the TCU is vulnerable
131. See Ferraz & Finan, “Exposing,” supra note 130; Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan,
“Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments”
(2011) 101:4 Amer Econ Rev 1274. But see also Yves Zamboni & Stephan Litschig, “Audit
Risk and Rent Extraction: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Brazil” (2013),
Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No 1270, online: <www.econ.upf.edu/docs/
papers/downloads/1270.pdf>.
132. See CGU, online: <http://www.cgu.gov.br/ODP/index.asp>.
133. See CGU, online: <http://www.cgu.gov.br/ODP/premios.asp>.
134. See CGU, online: <http://www.cgu.gov.br/PrevencaodaCorrupcao/
InformacoesEstrategicas/index.asp>.
135. Carlos Santiso, “Eyes Wide Shut? The Politics of Autonomous Audit Agencies in Emerging
Economies” (2007) Centro de Implementación de Politicas Públicas para la Equidad y el
Crecimiento Working Paper at 23, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=982663>; Melo, supra note 127 at 20-21.
136. Speck, supra note 85; Melo, supra note 127 at 21.
137. Ibid.
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to political capture.138 Thirdly, the liberal availability of judicial appeals limits the
ability of the TCU to punish those involved in wrongdoing effectively. While the
TCU may impose administrative and civil penalties, regular courts often strike
down such sanctions or take so long to decide these cases that they end up being
closed due to the statute of limitations.139
The municipal ambulance kickback scheme eventually uncovered through
“Operation Bloodsucker” provides an illustrative example of how institutional
multiplicity has proven to be an effective strategy at addressing some of these core
challenges within the TCU. The TCU’s formalistic and ossified auditing processes
initially failed to detect the scheme, which involved kickbacks to members of
Congress for the sale of overpriced ambulances and other medical equipment
to municipal governments. However, in 2004, as part of the aforementioned
program of random municipal audits,140 the CGU came across irregularities
in the public procurement processes used in some municipalities to purchase
ambulances for the public health care system; specifically, they discovered that
many municipalities had purchased non-operational or used vehicles despite the
fact that the government had paid for new ones, and that many cities that had
initiated procurement processes to acquire more vehicles had recently bought
ambulances that were not being used.141 Upon discovering these irregularities,
the CGU sent a document to the Minister of Health indicating that there was a
group manipulating procurement processes at the local level across the country
and embezzling public funds through the sale of overpriced ambulances to
municipalities. The CGU asked the Minister to take necessary measures to address
failures in procurement processes, while at the same time alerting the Federal
Police about the case. In 2006, the federal police unveiled that a total of 1,000
ambulances had been purchased under this scheme, for a total of $55 million
USD. In the same year, Congress started its own internal investigation through
a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito)
(“CPI”). The CPI recommended that 72 congressional representatives be removed

138. See Santiso, supra note 135; Alexandre Rocha, “Especialização e autonomia funcional no
âmbito do Tribunal de Contas da União” (2003) 40:157 Revista de Informação Legislativa
223 at 223-51. The TRT case is discussed in this Part, below.
139. See generally Santiso, supra note 135; Speck, supra note 85; Melo, supra note 127.
140. See Ferraz & Finan, “Exposing,” supra note 130.
141. See Leonardo Souza, “Quadrilha vendia ambulâncias com defeitos a prefeitos,” Folha de São
Paulo (23 May 2006), online: <www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc2305200620.htm>.
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from office for involvement in the scheme, but none were expelled or faced any
other penalty.142 We address the problem of the lack of sanctioning below.
The CGU’s ability to catch irregularities undetected by the TCU is partially
due to the fact that the CGU analyzes the effectiveness of government programs,
not just the formalities associated with expenditures.143 The Bloodsucker
scandal may thus be an example of compensation or complementarity. Some
may argue that the TCU’s failure to detect the scheme reflects deficiencies in
its auditing process, while the CGU’s success in identifying the irregularities
indicates that their auditing methods are more effective. If so, this would be
a case of compensation, in which the strengths of one institution compensate
for the weaknesses of another. On the other hand, this might be a case of
complementarity, in which two distinct but sound institutions complement
one another. The monitoring techniques of the CGU were specifically designed
with different parameters than those used by the TCU in order to increase the
likelihood that each institution could catch things undetected by the other.144
The CGU auditors’ detection of irregularities not captured by the TCU’s analysis
would therefore be an example of complementarity. But regardless of whether the
Bloodsucker incident is interpreted as a case of compensation or complementarity,
that the corrupt scheme was uncovered by authorities illustrates how overlapping
oversight functions may increase the chances that wrongdoing will be detected.
Institutional multiplicity has also been effective in overcoming the TCU’s
second problem, which Marcus A. Melo describes as “a lack of connection
between the professional work produced by its cadre of auditors and the political
logic that underlies decision-making at its top decision-making body.”145 There is
some dispute about the degree to which this disconnect affects the functioning

142. Power & Taylor “Introduction,” supra note 4 at 3; Marcelo Rocha, “Como se Desvia
Dinheiro no Brasil,” Revista Época (22 July 2012), online: <revistaepoca.globo.com/ideias/
noticia/2012/01/como-se-desvia-dinheiro-no-brasil.html>.
143. Maria R Loureiro et al, “Do Controle Interno ao Controle Social: A Múltipla Atuação
Da CGU na Democracia Brasileira” (2012) 17:60 Cadernos Gestão Pública e
Cidadania 54 at 57.
144. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15 (citing interviews conducted
with the TCU in April 2014).
145. Melo, supra note 127 at 21.
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of TCU.146 Argelina C. Figueiredo claims that it has a major impact: “[T]he
recommendations contained in the reports prepared by the TCU’s technical
personnel are usually not followed by its board of ministers for political reasons.”147
Another political scientist concludes that because of this gap between the TCU’s
technical and political organs, “[the TCU’s] effectiveness depends primarily on
the extent to which other actors, such as opposition legislators or the media, can
publicize its audits.”148 This is a case of compensation, as other institutions are
stepping in to compensate for the failures of the original institution.
A good example of the importance of institutional multiplicity in providing
an alternative channel for the technical cadre of auditors to seek further
investigation of suspicious activity is the case of a corruption scandal involving
the labour court in the state of São Paulo, also known as the TRT case. As Power
and Taylor describe:
[T]he cost of building the Regional Labor Court in São Paulo during the 1990s was
inflated nearly fourfold, with proceeds on the order of US$100 million allegedly
appropriated by Judge Nicolau dos Santos Neto (commonly refered to as ‘Lalau’),
with the participation of a senator, Luiz Estevão, and the president and vice president
of the construction company that won the building contract.149

The scandal came to the fore in 1998, but TCU auditors had called attention
to numerous irregularities in 1992, when the building was proposed.
The 1992 audit revealed so many irregularities that the TCU suggested
cancelling the contract with the construction company, withholding any future
146. In an interview, a high-level official at the TCU argued that the percentage of cases in
which there is this level of disagreement is low. The official emphasized that the decisions of
the political cadre need to be justified when they are not in line with the technical report.
This creates an accountability system in which those trying to politically manipulate the
process can be identified. The issue is whether there is any sanction associated with this.
Except for possible reputational sanctions, there do not seem to be any consequences
(especially if we consider that most of those occupying positions in the political body are
politicians at the end of their careers). An official of an accounting tribunal at the state level
challenged this statement by suggesting that while the percentage of cases in which there is
disagreement between the technical and the political body may be small, these may actually
be the most significant cases. Only a comprehensive assessment of all cases would be able
to provide insight as to who is right. See Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,”
supra note 15 at 13.
147. Argelina C Figueiredo, “The Role of Congress as an Agency of Horizontal Accountability:
Lessons from the Brazilian Experience” in Scott Mainwaring & Christopher Welna,
eds, Democratic Accountability in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003) 170 at 185.
148. Melo, supra note 127 at 23.
149. Power & Taylor, “Introduction,” supra note 4 at 2.
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transfers from Congress to the project, ordering the return of all money already
transferred to the federal government, and conducting a thorough investigation
of the project. The audit report reached the highest echelon of the TCU in 1993,
but the minister assigned to the case slowed its progression to a glacial place,
allowing construction (and the corruption scheme) to move forward. In 1995,
that minister retired, and the new minister in charge took an entire year to evaluate
it. In 1996, the TCU issued a decision: There were indeed irregularities, but since
the construction had already started and a lot of money had already been spent,
interrupting the project would be costlier than allowing it to be concluded. It is
estimated that those involved in the scheme embezzled approximately $35,000
USD per day, which included kickbacks to senators who approved the transfer of
federal funds to the construction project.150
The TCU’s failure in monitoring this project was finally remedied by a
member of Congress, the Public Prosecutor’s office, and the media.151 In 1996,
Senator Giovanni Queiroz, during a regular congressional session, blocked a
special transfer to the TRT project amounting to $5.5 million USD, only to
discover that the same transfer was eventually approved in December, when
Congress was in recess and only a few representatives remained behind to deal with
urgent matters. Queiroz approached the Public Prosecutors’ Office to suggest an
investigation of the project. After determining that Lalau’s assets and lifestyle—
including a $1 million USD apartment in Miami, luxury cars, and lavish parties
in expensive restaurants—exceeded his legitimate means, the Public Prosecutors’
150. Mauricio Lima & Rodrigo Vergara, “A Anatomia do Crime,” Revista Veja (2 August 2000) at
28-29, online: <http://veja.abril.com.br/020800/p_038.html>.
151. Brazil has witnessed a dramatic increase in investigative journalism since its return to
democracy, and the press has made valuable contributions to the discovery and investigation
of incidents of political corruption. See Venício Artur de Lima, Mídia: Crise Política e Poder
no Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006). However, political and
ideological interests continue to exercise influence over the country’s media, and journalists
face harassment, censorship, and violence. See Claudio Weber Abramo, “Brazil: A Portrait
of Disparities” (2007) 3:1 Brazilian Journalism Research 93; Mauro P Porto, “The Media
and Political Accountability” in Timothy J Power & Matthew M Taylor, eds, Corruption
and Democracy in Brazil: The Struggle for Accountability (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2011) at 107; Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press: Brazil”, online: <www.
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/brazil#.Uu9Hd_k7um4>. According to
the Committee to Protect Journalists, three Brazilian journalists—“all of them provincial
journalists murdered after reporting on local crime and corruption”—were killed for their
work in 2013, compared to four in 2012 and three in 2011. See Elana Beiser, Committee
to Protect Journalists, “Syria, Iraq, Egypt Most Deadly Nations for Journalists” (30 Dec
2013), online: <www.cpj.org/reports/2013/12/syria-iraq-egypt-most-deadly-nationsfor-journalis.php>.
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Office started an investigation and, in 1997, uncovered the connections between
all the parties involved and the money transfers that siphoned public resources
to private accounts.152
By 1998, the Public Prosecutors’ Office had collected enough evidence to
request that the judiciary sequester Lalau’s assets, as well as those belonging to all
others involved in the scheme. The scheme subsequently became public news and
was covered heavily by the media. Under public pressure, the judiciary ordered
Lalau’s removal from his position as chief justice of the labour tribunal in September
of that year, and directed the TCU to conduct a new audit of the project. This
time, the TCU reached a quick decision that there were irregularities and that
the construction should be suspended. It was only then that Congress suspended
transfers of federal funds to the project, as the TCU auditors recommended back
in 1992. In 1999, in a move motivated by electoral pressures, Congress set up
a Commission of Public Inquiry to investigate corruption in the judiciary, with
special attention to the labour law court. The Inquiry found that Lalau alone had
embezzled more than $50 million USD in the course of the scheme.153
In sum, this example illustrates that the existence of alternative mechanisms
of oversight and monitoring may address the shortcomings of existing auditing
institutions, especially if the institutions with overlapping jurisdiction have
different governance structures and therefore different systems of incentives. In
this case, the TCU initially failed to act, but the error was “fixed” by a member
of Congress, the Public Prosecutors’ office, and the media.
Finally, the TCU has increased its activity since the creation of the CGU
in 2001. The Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (“MESICIC”) notes that the
total number of processes conducted by the TCU—including audits, inspections,
consultations, and complaints—rose from 6,135 in 2006 to 8,019 in 2010.154
These two events suggest that institutional multiplicity and the mechanisms
through which it may impact the operation of accountability institutions deserve
further investigation, even if no causal connection between the events can be
empirically tested or proven.

152. Lima & Vergara, supra note 150 at 28-29.
153. Santiso, supra note 135 at 26.
154. OAS, Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption (MESICIC), Federative Republic of Brazil Final Report, OEA/Ser.L/SG/
MESICIC/doc.330/12, rev. 4 (2012) at 20 [MESICIC].
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2.

INSTITUTIONAL MULTIPLICITY IN INVESTIGATION

The core investigative institutions in Brazil are the Federal Public Prosecutors’
Office (Ministério Público Federal) (“MPF”) and the Federal Police (Departamento
da Polícia Federal) (“DPF”). The MPF typically conducts investigations into
criminal matters in conjunction with the DPF. Indeed, the rise in the number
of DPF investigations over the last 5 to 10 years155 appears to be the result not
only of an increase in resources for the police but also increased cooperation
between the DPF, the MPF, and other investigative bodies such as state public
prosecutors, Revenue Service Inspectors, and government ministries.156 In many
cases, joint task forces have been formed to better coordinate investigations. The
results appear positive,157 providing strong evidence that institutional multiplicity
has led to productive collaboration.
While the MPF and DPF collaborate frequently on high profile cases and
operations,158 the same is not true for day-to-day investigations, in which even
quick consultations between the DPF and the MPF are rare. In cases involving
“serious” violations, the MPF consults with the DPF once a month, and all
communication is via paper memoranda. This frequency of communication is
fairly low compared to other countries such as the United States, and can hardly
be classified as cooperation. While the MPF may request additional information
from the DPF, such petitions must be done via publicly available memoranda,
reducing the speed and efficacy of the investigative process. If the DPF does not
comply with the MPF’s request, the MPF may step in and conduct an investigation
on its own, but such inquiries are rare. In addition, the constitutionality of the
MPF’s investigations into potential criminal matters remains unresolved. A
case involving the issue has been pending before the Brazilian Supreme Court
(“STF”) since 2008,159 and, in the absence of a firm resolution regarding the legal
status of such independent investigations, the STF has made it clear that those
cases raise suspicions and may be invalidated. In addition to this constitutional
ambiguity, the exercise of such powers faces political opposition; a bill proposing
to eliminate the MPF’s investigative authority was introduced but voted down by

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See generally Carson & Prado, “Mapping,” supra note 14.
Arantes, supra note 2 at 200, 205.
Ibid.
Ibid.
RExt. 593727, Supremo Tibunal Federal, em 02.10.2008.
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the Brazilian Congress in 2013.160 Given these legal and legislative developments,
public prosecutors are careful and selective about the cases in which they
proceed alone.161
Despite being the exception rather than the rule, in a few cases the investigative
powers of the MPF have compensated for the lack of police action. Cases in
which the MPF played a prominent role include the recent Mensalão case. Indeed,
according to the Attorney General (Procurador Geral da República), it would not
have been possible to prosecute and convict those involved in the Mensalão case
without the investigation conducted by the MPF.162 Given the current legal and
political climate, however, it remains uncertain whether the MPF will retain
these powers moving forward. If they are curtailed or, alternatively, confirmed
or enhanced, it will be an opportunity to test the hypothesis advanced in this
article. Such a change could allow for assessment of the impact that institutional
multiplicity may have on the overall level of criminal investigations in Brazil and
their success.
While there is multiplicity in criminal investigations, the DPF has no
jurisdiction over civil investigations. In actions concerning administrative
improbity, the MPF is the only institution that can officially conduct a civil
investigation. However, the MPF’s civil investigations can benefit from
investigations in the criminal and administrative spheres. Since they often relate
to the same facts or actions, the investigative efforts of the MPF frequently share
similarities with the investigative efforts of the Internal Affairs Division of the
Union (Corregedoria Geral da União) (“CGR”), the arm of the CGU in charge
of administrative investigations. Similarly, civil and administrative investigations
can feed into criminal investigations and vice versa. Indeed, the CGU has worked
closely with the DPF in most of its operations.163 In such cases, while each
institution may be focusing on a different aspect of the investigation, they can
complement each other’s work.
Two recent examples of this type of complementarity are the Two-Way Road
(Mão Dupla) and 13th of May (13 de maio) investigations, which respectively
160. Isabel Braga, Newspaper O Globo, “PEC 37 é votada e rejeitada na Câmara
dos Deputados” (25 June 2013), online: <www.oglobo.globo.com/pais/
pec-37-votada-rejeitada-na-camara-dos-deputados-8806597>.
161. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15 at 16.
162. Gustavo Gantois, Terra, “Gurgel: Sem Investigação do MP, Ação do Mensalão Não
Teria Existido” (11 March 2013), online: <noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/politica/
julgamento-do-mensalao/gurgel-sem-investigacao-do-mp-acao-do-mensalao-nao-teriaexistido,d3b5f2532da5d310VgnVCM5000009ccceb0aRCRD.html>.
163. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15 at 16.
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concerned a company hired by the government to build roads and the
embezzlement of education funds by municipal officials. In the Two-Way Road
case, cooperation between the DPF and the CGU in 2010 uncovered a scheme
in which civil servants from the Department of Roads and Transportation of
the State of Ceará accepted bribes from Delta, a company contracted by the
Federal Department of Infrastructure and Transportation, in exchange for
allowing the firm to charge more for their services and to use lower quality
materials than the ones specified in the contract. In the course of the 13th of
May investigation, officials from the CGU and the DPF uncovered a scheme
in which 26 municipalities in the state of Bahia were misappropriating funds
from Fundeb, the national program to finance primary and secondary education.
In most cases, civil servants and mayors had created shadow companies that
pretended to sell goods and services to the municipality (e.g., school buses and
event organization services) but were actually redirecting federal funds to their
own personal bank accounts.
The expansion of high profile and widely publicized corruption investigations
undertaken by Brazilian authorities in recent years, and the heightened public
awareness they have triggered, represent notable changes in the country’s
accountability processes.164 We hypothesize that these enhancements to the
investigatory capacity of the country’s institutions are attributable, at least in
part, to multiplicity. In the presence of multiple authorities able to pursue cases
of suspected corruption, investigations have been launched into misconduct at all
levels of the Federation, across all branches of government, and into the private
sector as well. Other factors have likely also contributed to these performance
improvements, however, including in particular initiatives undertaken in 1998
and enhanced after 2003 to strengthen the DPF.165 With an increased budget,
more personnel, a newly defined focus on corruption, and the systematic use
of catchy names to gain publicity for operations, the DPF has become an
increasingly potent force in fighting corruption in Brazil. Nevertheless, it is
notable that the increase in criminal investigations and operations at the DPF
between 2005 and 2009166 was followed by an increase in civil investigations
initiated by the MPF on corruption and administrative impropriety between
2007 and 2011.167 Although we cannot prove a causal connection, our hypothesis
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is that the strengthening of the DPF may have had a positive impact on the
MPF’s performance and vice versa.
While multiplicity may result from having independent institutions with
the ability to conduct investigations that will lead to criminal corruption charges
(inter-institutional multiplicity), there is also a degree of multiplicity in the fact
that individual actors are independent to act within each of these institutions
(intra-institutional multiplicity). For example, while Part II(B)(1) of this article,
above, emphasized how the concentration and monopolization of authority in
the TCU gives politically-appointed ministers the discretion to halt auditors’
inquiries into accounting or budget irregularities, individual prosecutors at the
MPF are largely autonomous: If one prosecutor receives information concerning
potential corruption and decides not to investigate the case, another prosecutor
is free to proceed with the investigation. This lack of centralization, which we
consider an example of intra-institutional multiplicity, has largely strengthened
the MPF’s power to act as an effective anti-corruption body.168
3.

INSTITUTIONAL MULTIPLICITY IN PUNISHMENT

Multiple legal reforms over the past several decades appear to have been aimed at
fostering institutional multiplicity in Brazil’s systems for punishing corruption. A
core motivation for these reforms has been the heavy burden of proof necessary
to establish guilt in criminal cases. The Law of Administrative Improbity of 1992,
enacted to expedite corruption cases and to empower the MPF’s office as a body
of horizontal accountability, allows prosecutors to choose between bringing civil
or criminal charges depending on the amount and quality of evidence collected.
As Professor Rogério Bastos Arantes explains, this law provides an alternative to
rather burdensome criminal trials because the burden of proof is lower in civil
cases.169 Available civil penalties for individuals include the removal of a public
official from office, temporary suspension of political rights, and reimbursement
to the public coffers.
However, the 1992 reform did not produce the expected results, as the strategy
required prosecutors to continue to rely on the Brazilian judiciary, an institution
plagued by problems. Since 1992, very few civil corruption cases have reached a
conclusion and resulted in any sanction.170
168. Maria Tereza Sadek & Rosangela Batista Cavalcanti, “The New Brazilian Public Prosecution:
An Agent of Accountability” in Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, eds, Democratic
Accountability in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 201 at 208-09.
169. Arantes, supra note 2 at 198-99.
170. Ibid.
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Arantes argues that the fifteen years of evidence on administrative improbity
cases suggests that they are not entirely effective in the courts, whether as a result
of the slowness of the proceedings, numerous dilatory appeals, or, frequently,
judges’ concerns about the MP’s authority to act in this arena, as when they fail to
recognize the legal legitimacy of suits or the legality of procedures adopted during
the investigation. Of 572 suits brought by the prosecutors in São Paulo since 1992,
for example, fewer than 10 have reached a definitive conclusion … to date.171
Indeed, the average time for trying cases concerning administrative
improbity was approximately five years in the regional federal courts, which is
quite lengthy.172
More recently, the situation seems to have changed significantly. The CGU
was created in 2001 to “provide effective and efficient sanction of administrative
misconduct by public officials while criminal investigations and prosecution
were being processed in the federal judiciary.”173 Since its creation, the CGU
has extensively expanded its jurisdiction. In 2001, the Secretariat of Federal
Internal Control (Secretaria Federal de Controle) (“SFC”), previously located
in the Ministry of Finance, was incorporated into the CGU, and the CGU
started operating the internal control of the Federal Executive.174 A year later, it
incorporated the Office of the Ombudsman General (Ouvidoria-Geral da União),
previously housed in the Ministry of Justice. In 2006, it created the Secretariat
for Corruption Prevention and Strategic Information (Secretaria de Prevenção da
Corrupção e Informações Estratégicas), becoming the central authority overseeing
compliance with the Code of Conduct applicable to all federal public officers.
The CGU is also responsible for coordinating the internal investigative units
housed within each department of the federal government.175
Independent of the civil and criminal sanctions imposed by the judiciary, the
CGU, the TCU, and internal accountability bodies can impose administrative
sanctions on actors found to have engaged in corrupt activities. At the federal level,
the legislation requires every department to have a unit responsible for conducting
171. Ibid.
172. MESICIC, supra note 154 at 47.
173. OECD, Integrity Review of Brazil: Managing Risks for a Cleaner Public Service (Paris:
OECD, 2012) at 243.
174. Ibid at 56-57.
175. The structure of the Brazilian Office of the Comptroller General was changed in September
2013 by Decree 8109, notably to accommodate new mandates, but the structure
maintained previous ones nonetheless. See Controladoria-Geral da União, “CGU Tem Nova
Estrutura Administrativa” (September 2013), online: <www.cgu.gov.br/noticias/2013/09/
cgu-tem-nova-estrutura-administrativa>.
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administrative investigations and disciplinary procedures and to forward such
proceedings to higher authorities when appropriate. Investigations are started ex
officio or upon receipt of a report with credible allegations of misconduct. These
units are responsible for submitting data and coordinating actions with CGU,
which performs a subsidiary role: It initiates or intervenes in administrative
investigations and disciplinary procedures in cases where the independence of the
unit is questionable or when high-level authorities are involved. Between 2003
and 2014, the Administrative Disciplinary System of the Federal Administration
(which comprises the CGU and all these departmental units) dismissed 5,125
public officials for corruption or mismanagement, averaging 427 dismissals per
year, or more than one per day. The overall number of dismissals is significant
as it represents approximately 0.9% of the total number of federal government
officials employed in 2014.176
As discussed in Part I(B), above, under the new Clean Company Act,
corporations and other legal entities involved in corruption may be called
before an administrative liability proceeding by the authorities of any affected
government department or, in some cases, by the CGU. Penalties for corporate
misconduct can include sizeable fines as well as potential debarment from public
procurement. An illustrative example is the Gautama case. In July 2007, after
an investigation uncovered fraud both in bidding processes and contracts with
the federal government, the CGU debarred the construction company Gautama
from government contracting, and suspended all 50 contracts in which audits
revealed misconduct. In imposing the penalties, the Minister of the CGU
publicly stated that administrative sanctions were the most effective method of
punishing corrupt companies as well as in deterring future misconduct.177 In
addition to the cancellation of existing contracts and debarment of the company
involved in the scandal, the investigation led to the resignation of one minister
and the imprisonment of almost 50 people, including high-level federal and
state government officials, former members of Congress, entrepreneurs, and
employees of the construction company. It is estimated that of the 420.3 million
BRL ($146.8 million CAD) paid by the federal government to the Gautama
Company, around 36.5% (153.4 million BRL or $53.5 million CAD) was
misappropriated by private parties.

176. CGU, Dismissal Report (June 2015), online: <http://www.cgu.gov.br/assuntos/
atividade-disciplinar/relatorios-de-punicoes-expulsivas/arquivos/punicoes-mensal.pdf>.
177. Andrea Michael, “CGU Proibe Contratos da União com a Gautama,” Folha de São Paulo (24
July 2007), online: <www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc2407200708.htm>.
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In 2008, the CGU created the National Registry of Ineligible and Suspended
Contractors, a public database that consolidates and disseminates information
on companies debarred from contracting with federal or state administrations.
Inclusion in the Registry was initially voluntary, but became mandatory under
the Clean Company Act. As of November 2015, 12,103 sanctioned suppliers and
contractors were listed on the Registry, including some from the states and one
from a municipality.178
A 2010 analysis of the effectiveness of the Brazilian judiciary in preventing
and combating corruption revealed the apparent superiority of administrative
procedures and sanctions in comparison to their conventional criminal and civil
justice counterparts. Examining data on public sector dismissals, Carlos H.R. de
Alencar found that nearly two-thirds of employees administratively discharged
between 1993 and 2005 had been removed for reasons linked to corruption.179
Furthermore, while 333 of 441 of the discharged employees in his study appealed
their terminations to the judiciary, extremely few of those applications (4.53%)
were successful. That said, while administrative sanctions were infrequently
overturned, they also rarely resulted in criminal charges or penalties; only
one-third of officials dismissed for corruption-related reasons were prosecuted,
and the conviction rate in those cases (3.17%) was notably low. Nonetheless, the
high and rising number of administrative sanctions imposed, and the anecdotal
evidence provided by the Gautama case, suggest that the CGU is one the most
important institutions involved in the punishment of corruption-related offences
in Brazil today.
Authority to impose administrative sanctions is not limited to the CGU and
individual government ministries, however. As an external oversight body, the
TCU also has the power to impose fines or order other administrative penalties
for corruption-related offences, including compensation for losses caused to the
public administration, removal from office, temporary suspension of political
rights, and debarment from public contracting. The TCU’s legal authority to apply
sanctions for misconduct is particularly strong compared to autonomous audit
agencies in other Latin American countries.180 In recent years, the institution has
demonstrated an increased willingness to exert those powers. In 2006, the TCU
disqualified thirteen individuals from holding commissioned or trust positions

178. See Portal da Transparencia, online: <http://www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br/ceis/>.
179. Carlos HR de Alencar, Prevenção e Combate à Corrupção e Eficácia Judicial no Brasil (Brasilia:
5º Concurso de Monografias da CGU, 2010) 1 at 52.
180. See generally Santiso, supra note 135.
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and barred twenty-three firms from participating in competitive federal bidding,
but by 2010, these figures increased to 103 and 109, respectively.181
Bruno W. Speck argues that the authority of the judiciary to hear appeals and
possibly revise or overturn the TCU’s sanctions reduces their overall effectiveness,
however.182 While acknowledging the need to protect against potential abuses of
the administrative sanctioning system, Speck asserts that such judicial appeals
are disruptive rather than salutary for two reasons. First, the standard for judicial
review of the TCU’s decisions remained unresolved by the courts. The TCU
functions as a tribunal, following procedural steps that are very similar to those
that would be followed in court. Some cases argue that the judiciary can review
the substance of TCU’s decisions, while others affirm that the review is only
procedural.183 This dispute has generated much uncertainty regarding the finality
of TCU decisions, negatively impacting the effectiveness of TCU sanctions.
Moreover, the courts overturn TCU decisions at a somewhat higher rate than
they would if judicial review were merely procedural. The second problem is
time. As discussed below, the Brazilian judiciary generally operates at a glacial
pace. As a result, many appeals take many years to be decided and either run
up against statutes of limitations or, in some cases, become moot (for example,
because the accused leaves public office or dies).
CGU orders are also subject to judicial review, but unlike TCU decisions,
they are rarely overturned by the courts. When asked about the discrepancy, a
CGU official indicated that the CGU has a team of lawyers that makes sure
that every step in the administrative process is in absolute conformity with the
courts’ most recent proclamations concerning the scope of their review. In short,

181. MESICIC, supra note 154 at 20.
182. Speck, supra note 85 at 144.
183. For judicial decisions declaring that the judiciary may only conduct a procedural review of
TCU decisions, see Supremo Tribunal Federal, Mandado, de Segurança (MS) nº 7.280 (Rel.
Ministro Henrique D’Avila); Superior Tribunal de Justiça Recurso Especial 8970/SP (Rel.
Ministro Humberto Gomes de Barro, 1ª Turma), Diário da Justiça, em 09.03.93, at 2533.
For decisions holding that the judiciary may perform a substantive review, see Supremo
Tribunal Federal, Mandado, de Segurança (MS) nº 28745, Liminar emitida em 06.05.2010
(Rel. Ministra Ellen Gracie); Tribunal Regional Federal 5a. Região, Apelação Civel: AC
380126 PE 2005.83.02.000431-8, em 11.07.2007. For doctrinal analyses, see Roberto
Mateus (2009) at 37-39; Aguiar Filho (2009) at 21-22 (arguing that the judiciary can only
perform procedural reviews of the TCU decisions). But see also Bandeira de Mello (1974)
at 172; Cretella Junior (1986) at 9; Di Pietro (1996) at 29; Alexandre Pacheco Lopes Filho
(2012) (arguing that the judiciary can also perform substantive reviews of TCU decisions).
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the CGU is “making the administrative processes bullet proof ” to minimize the
chances that its decisions will be struck down by courts afterwards.184
As the ultimate sanctioning authority in most corruption cases, the Brazilian
judicial system displays “impressive institutional strength, illustrated by clear
rules, impressive autonomy, and decisions that are widely adhered to by other
branches of government,” but the courts “operate[] in an institutional framework
that tends to delay clear, universally applicable, and binding policy decisions.”185
Along the same lines, a 2012 report by a MESICIC committee of experts
documented the judiciary’s poor rates of resolution in corruption-related cases.186
The Brazilian judiciary’s underperformance relates not to sporadic errors in
execution but rather to fundamental structural problems such as corruption and
excessively formalistic, burdensome procedural rules.187 Our discussion focuses
on two broad categories of factors that contribute to the overall inefficiency
of the country’s sanctioning system: (1) lengthy delays in proceedings, and (2)
overly rigid rules and procedures. We do not address the problem of corruption
in the judiciary.
Turning first to the protracted pace of legal proceedings, the causes of the
delays under the current system are manifold. First, there is a considerable
degree of ineffectiveness and a lack of rationality in management of the judicial
system.188 At the operational level, as of 2012, the judiciary utilized at least 210
different, unintegrated computer systems, frustrating attempts at coordination
and efficient administration.189 The National Judicial Council (Conselho Nacional
de Justiça) (“CNJ”)—created in 2004 with a mandate to exercise external control
over the judicial branch to ensure that the system operates morally, efficiently, and
effectively—did successfully increase productivity in the courts by 7.5% between
2009 and 2013. While these results appear promising, some officials within the
CNJ have suggested that they reflect an organizational prioritization of simple,
uncomplicated cases that shifts more complex cases (such as those involving
184. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15 at 19.
185. Matthew M Taylor, “The Federal Judiciary and Electoral Courts” in Timothy J Power &
Matthew M Taylor, eds, Corruption and Democracy in Brazil: The Struggle for Accountability
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011) 162 at 162.
186. MESICIC, supra note 154 at 46.
187. See generally William C Prillaman, The Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America:
Declining Confidence in the Rule of Law (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2000); Taylor,
supra note 185; Power & Taylor, “Introduction,” supra note 4.
188. Ibid; Sanctis, supra note 18 at 1.
189. MESICIC, supra note 154 at 37; MR Machado & LMA Ferreira, Estudos Sobre o Caso TRT
(São Paulo: Direito GV, 2014).
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corruption) farther down the list.190 In addition, while this article was being
written, the CNJ decided to abolish the Open Justice (Justiça Aberta) initiative,
an electronic system created in 2007 for jurisdictional control, corruption
prevention, and transparency of the judiciary.191
Beyond the problems facing the judicial branch’s management and
administration systems, the courts are over-stretched by the excessive number
of cases before them. Brazilian courts—including the Supreme Court—cannot
select the cases they will hear, meaning that even unmeritorious or frivolous cases
have a right to a hearing. The lack of impediments to initial filings, coupled
with a paucity of extrajudicial means of dispute resolution (e.g., mediations and
arbitrations), contributes to significant backlogs across the judicial system.192 The
burden at the federal level is made excessively acute by the breadth of causes of
action that can be “constitutionalized” and thus brought before federal courts.
Even given the CNJ’s efforts to modernize the judiciary and prioritize certain
types of cases, the total number of cases pending before the federal justice system
rose from 7.6 million in 2009 to 8.1 million in 2009. In 2010 alone, the Brazilian
Supreme Court received 72,000 new cases.193
Third, the appellate system is overly generous to defendants who can afford
to pay for continuous appeals; if all available avenues are pursued, a standard
criminal proceeding must exhaust four judicial instances in order to be considered
concluded and no longer subject to appeal (trânsito em julgado).194 Because the
Constitution prohibits the execution of sanctions before the final resolution of a
case,195 the multiple levels of appeal allow defendants to drag out proceedings and
delay punishment for years, if not decades. If defendants and their counsel prolong
the appellate process enough, the statute of limitations may toll, thus requiring
dismissal of the case and precluding the imposition of any sanctions. The 2012
MESICIC Report notes that Brazil’s multiple appeals process “contributes, in
practice, to a final (not subject to appeal) judgment being virtually unattainable,
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15.
Ofício Circular nº 25/CNJ/COR/2015.
Sanctis, supra note 18 at 2.
MESICIC, supra note 154 at 43.
In the first instance, a single judge reviews the evidence and analyzes the facts and law. A
judgment at first instance may be appealed to a collegiate body, which will review the facts
and law. That collegiate body decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice to
examine legal questions under federal law. Finally, the STJ is subject to appeal to the STF
under an “extraordinary appeal,” in which constitutional issues are raised. See ibid.
195. “[N]o one shall be considered guilty before the issuing of a final and unappealable penal
sentence.” See Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988, art 5, LVII, online:
<http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-constitution>.
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often leading to the statute of limitations to run on cases and, consequently,
impunity for those accused of acts of corruption.”196 The OECD Report presents
criticisms along the same lines.197
Beyond the lengthy delays that plague Brazil’s courts, the performance and
efficiency of the judiciary are further undermined by the legal system’s excessively
formalistic rules and rigid standards. Brazilian courts still follow so-called
positivistic doctrines, which impose a high evidentiary burden on prosecutors
to interpret the law, resulting in a very low rate of corruption convictions. In
addition to the formalism regarding the burden of proof, courts are also very
strict in determining the admissibility of evidence. For instance, the Supreme
Court of Justice (“STJ”), the second highest court in the country, dismissed
a high profile case, Operação Castelo de Areia, because the recording of phone
conversations was considered illegal. While the police had requested and secured
judicial authorization to perform the recording, the judicial authorization itself
was ruled illegal because the request was based on an anonymous lead, which
could not be considered grounds for a court of law to grant authorization for
the recording. Such excessive procedural formality in the courts undermines the
effective punishment of corruption in Brazil.
The “Collorgate” case provides an excellent illustration of how deficiencies
in the Brazilian judicial system weaken the overall accountability process. After
his impeachment by Congress in 1992, former President Fernando Collor was
formally charged with three counts of corruption-related offences, but a number
of factors allowed him to escape conviction or sanction in the courts. First,
reflecting the protracted pace of resolution in the judicial system, the last decision
in the Collor matter was issued on 24 April 2014—more than twenty years after
Congress launched a CPI into the scandal. Due to those delays, two of the three
charges against the former President had to be dismissed because the statute of
limitations expired. Citing the prosecution’s inability to meet the high evidentiary
requirements to prove personal wrongdoing, the Brazilian Supreme Court finally
acquitted Collor of the third and final corruption charge,198 although other
individuals more directly involved in the scheme were convicted and sentenced.
The Collorgate case offers an example of another troubling trend in the
resolution of corruption cases in Brazil. While high-level politicians and business
leaders typically escape sanction for corruption-related offences, their subordinates,
who have often engaged directly in corrupt activities but only at the behest or for
196. MESICIC, supra note 154 at 44.
197. OECD Phase 3 Brazil Report, supra note 46 at 45, 47.
198. AP 465 / DF, em 24.04.2014
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the benefit of their superiors, have often been held legally accountable for their
misconduct. The 2013 Mensalão case represents a potentially significant shift in
the assignment of culpability for corruption offences, however. In that case, the
Supreme Court imposed vicarious liability on superiors who, by nature of their
relationship with the acting party, could be assumed by the court to have ordered
the subordinate to commit a criminal act. While this high profile case resulted in
prison sentences for top-level officials and politicians, it is too early to know how
lower courts will incorporate the decision into their own jurisprudence.

III. INSTITUTIONAL MULTIPLICITY IN THE BRAZILIAN
CLEAN COMPANY ACT
While there is a great deal of research exploring the system of accountability for
the public sector in Brazil,199 there is almost no literature examining the system of
accountability as it applies to private actors, and especially companies operating
abroad. This lack of scholarship is due partly to the novelty of the Clean Company
Act, which has only been in force since 2014. Recognizing that the recentness of
the Act makes it hard to provide empirical evidence about its operation and to
assess its effectiveness, this Part analyzes the Act’s potential. Building on the idea
discussed in Parts II(B)(1)-(2), above, that institutional multiplicity is a desirable
strategy in accountability systems, this Part argues that the Clean Company Act’s
establishment of civil and administrative liability for legal persons is likely to
provide more effective enforcement and punishment than the alternative of
imposing criminal liability, which would have limited jurisdiction over such cases
to the judiciary.
The Clean Company Act is not the first initiative to use institutional multiplicity
to bypass problems with the Brazilian judiciary. Administrative bodies such as the
TCU and CGU have long searched for ways to impose administrative sanctions
that take immediate effect and do not depend on judicial authorization for their
enforcement. While administrative penalties remain subject to judicial appeal,
they differ from criminal or civil penalties imposed by courts in that they may be
imposed while the judicial process is pending. Given the judiciary’s glacial pace,
administrative sanctions may be in place for years even if ultimately revoked.
Indeed, the TCU has been concentrating more on imposing sanctions such as
removal from office and exclusion from public procurement—sanctions that can
199. See e.g. Power & Taylor, “Introduction,” supra note 4; Prado & Carson, “Mapping,” supra
note 14; Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15.
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take effect immediately and generate financial and reputational costs.200 Similarly,
the CGU has also been relying on immediately enforceable administrative
sanctions. Considering the risk that sanctions may be reversed through judicial
appeals, the CGU has also ensured that administrative procedures closely follow
the requirements imposed by the judiciary, in order to reduce the chances of the
decision being reversed.201 These efforts, which have been in place since before
the enactment of the Clean Company Act, seem to have been proven effective,
as the number of administrative decisions reversed on judicial review has
been fairly low.202
Recognizing the success that this reliance on administrative sanctions for
individuals has achieved in curtailing corruption in Brazil (especially when
compared to the performance of the judiciary),203 the penalties for legal entities
under the Clean Company Act are also primarily administrative in nature and thus
deliberately avoid the judiciary as much as possible.204 It is interesting to note that
the Act offers a few innovations over the pre-existing systems of administrative
sanctions. Perhaps most important is the strict liability clause, which largely
reduces the burden of proof, consequently reducing the risks that the judiciary
may reverse the administrative decision on evidentiary grounds. Also innovative
are the comprehensive scope and broad definitions of the Act, discussed in
Part I(B), above. This breadth reduces the risk of judicial appeals that rely on
the narrowness of legal provisions and on formalist statutory interpretation.
Indeed, the Act made it very hard for the parties to rely on legal loopholes to
avoid sanctions. These innovations seem designed to address the problems of the
Brazilian judiciary discussed in Part II, above.
In sum, the hypothesis developed here is that the legislation’s heavy reliance
on administrative investigation and sanctions was deliberately designed to avoid
the obstacles that one normally faces with judicial action in Brazil, especially in
corruption-related cases. The Act relies on institutional multiplicity, incorporating
some of the lessons learned in other spheres of the Brazilian accountability system
while also bringing some interesting innovations. These institutional innovations
may help overcome some of the obstacles that have prevented Brazil from
effectively fighting corruption since its return to democracy.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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The substance of the new Clean Company Act’s provisions is not its only
innovative feature; as discussed in Part I(B), above, the statute’s reliance on a
multitude of high-level administrative organizations to conduct investigations
and enforce such provisions is also innovative. While this can be interpreted
as a strategy to rely on institutional multiplicity, it may also involve trade-offs.
Specifically, institutional multiplicity may exacerbate two of the problems that
have motivated the creation of dedicated anti-corruption agencies (“ACAs”)
in many countries: coordination problems and lack of expertise. Theoretically,
the centralization of all anti-corruption activities into a single ACA should
facilitate the sharing of information and intelligence, thus greatly reducing
coordination problems. Centralization could also allow managers and staff to gain
specialized experience with and knowledge of the particular issues surrounding
corruption.205 While ACAs have often failed to meet such expectations or to
contribute meaningfully to corruption reduction, the challenges presented by
coordination problems and lack of specialization loom over the institutional
multiplicity strategy.
While it may be advisable to keep related cases separate under certain
circumstances, such as when dealing with different evidentiary standards, in
other cases there may be advantages in coordinating prosecutorial efforts. In the
TRT case, discussed in Part II(B)(1), above,206 enhanced communication and
collaboration between those conducting the civil and the criminal trials could
have saved a significant amount of resources for the legal system.207 As a result
of the simultaneous and separate civil and criminal lawsuits, more than ten
different proceedings related to the TRT scandal were pending before Brazilian
courts as of May 2014.208 This is a result of what Maira R. Machado calls the
“compartmentalization of legal knowledge,” which demands that different
spheres of the law (administrative, civil, and criminal) deal with the same set
of events independently of each other, despite obvious interconnections.209
This compartmentalization has been taken to an extreme in the TRT case, as
subdivisions within each of the three spheres have led to an unnecessary repetition
of proceedings, evidence, and document production in cases that have included
205. Patrick Meagher, “Anti-Corruption Agencies: Rhetoric Versus Reality” (2005) 8:1 J
Pol Ref 69 at 72.
206. See Machado & Ferreira, supra note 189.
207. Ibid.
208. Ibid.
209. Maira R Machado, “Contra a Departamentalização do Saber Jurídico: A Contribuição dos
Estudos de Caso Para o Campo Direito e Desenvolvimento” in Direito e Desenvolvimento no
Brasil do Século XXI (Brasília: IPEA/Conpedi, 2013) 177 at 180-83.
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criminal trials for the accused individuals, appeals of administrative sanctions,
civil restitution proceedings to recover the embezzled funds, and bankruptcy
proceedings involving the company at the centre of the scheme.210
The lack of communication and coordination in the TRT case contrasts
with the more recent examples of collaboration between the CGU and DPF
discussed in Part II(B), above. Such cooperation seems to build on the fact
that the Brazilian courts have authorized sharing of evidence provided in the
criminal and the administrative spheres. Thus, evidence collected by the DPF
in the criminal investigation can be used by CGU in the administrative process
and vice versa.211 Bolstered by institutional rules and structures that allow and
facilitate such cooperation, the CGU and DPF have increased efforts to share
evidence and collaborate on cases. This type of coordination may not only
reduce system inefficiencies but also enhance each entity’s individual capacity
to fight corruption in its respective sphere, thus strengthening each institution’s
ability to perform its own role effectively. In the case of the Clean Company Act,
there are no explicit mechanisms to create or foster this kind of collaboration,
although it could be potentially useful in corruption cases in which the police
are investigating individuals while the CGU is pursuing administrative charges
against an implicated company.
The lack of coordination is not only a problem in the judiciary. As discussed
in Part II(B)(2), above, the individual independence of Brazilian public
prosecutors can be perceived as a form of intra-institutional multiplicity that is
advantageous for the accountability system as a whole. However, it may also lead
to duplication of efforts and inefficient use of resources. Individual prosecutors
may not communicate with other prosecutors working on different aspects of
the same case, and they may not share information about best practices that
could enhance efficiency.212 Thus, prosecutorial independence may also foster
coordination problems that can ultimately impair anti-corruption efforts. In the
context of the Clean Company Act, the same problem may occur if the highest
level of administration in the local, state, or federal government decides to
investigate or prosecute the same case independently. As we argue in Part I(B),
above, the lack of precision as to which authorities will enforce the Act may create
multiplicity but may also impair coordination.
An example of an effort to curtail such problems in the public prosecutor’s
office is the State Strategy to Fight Corruption (Programa Estratégia Estadual de
210. Machado & Ferreira, supra note 189.
211. Alencar, supra note 179 at 31.
212. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15 at 22.
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Combate à Corrupção) (“ECCO”). The ECCO won the Innovare Institute Prize
for Best Strategy to Fight Corruption created by the Public Prosecutors office
in 2013.213 The ECCO provides individual prosecutors with a “toolkit of best
practices” to adopt preventive measures to fight corruption. The use of the toolkit
is discretionary, so the program does not impair the individual independence
of prosecutors. Instead, the idea is that adoption of the tools by prosecutorial
offices throughout the country will enhance efficiency by reducing the time each
individual prosecutor needs to invest to determine the best course of action.
Moreover, by providing prosecutors with a set of best practices, the toolkits foster
consistency in prosecutorial criteria for adopting preventive measures, reducing
both the risk and perception that prosecutions may be politically motivated. The
initiative was well received: 75% of MP offices in the state of Rondônia have agreed
to participate in the initiative. Unfortunately, there is no data on the effectiveness
of the measures adopted by the individual offices. Nevertheless, perhaps this
initiative can serve as a model for the enforcement of the Clean Company Act.
From an institutional design perspective, these examples suggest that the
supposed trade-off between independence and coordination can be addressed
effectively through institutional malleability. Creating institutional structures that
allow but do not require otherwise independent entities to coordinate when feasible
and beneficial can encourage efficient and effective inter- and intra-institutional
collaboration while protecting organizational autonomy. In the context of the
TRT case, if the legal system had maintained its existing institutional multiplicity
with separate spheres for civil, criminal, and administrative cases but introduced
an element of malleability to permit prosecutors from those arenas to share
evidence to the extent practicable and helpful, resources could have been saved
while the integrity of the system was upheld. The ECCO initiative offers another
example of the benefits of combining institutional multiplicity with malleability:
It provides the tools for coordinated action but leaves room for independent
action as well.
As the examples in Parts II(A)-(B), above, illustrate, the effects of institutional
multiplicity in oversight and investigation in Brazil have not been uniform,
sometimes resulting in compensation, sometimes complementarity, and, in other
cases, collaboration. This diversity reflects the existence of malleable institutional
structures that permit but do not force coordination. The design of structures
that encourage and nourish coordination when advantageous for the system as a
213. Pedro Abi-Ecab, “Práticas: Estratégia Estadual de Combate a Corrupção” (Porto
Velho: Instituto Innovare, 2013), online: <www.premioinnovare.com.br/praticas/
estrategia-estadual-de-combate-a-corrupcao-ecco/>.
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whole is clearly a challenging task. Sergio Praça and Matthew M. Taylor suggest
that the evolution of the web of accountability institutions in Brazil has been
characterized by self-reinforcing reforms in multiple institutions, which ended up
generating what they call an “autocatalytic process of reform.”214 This may explain
why there have been so many coordination efforts in Brazil in the last decade.
While acknowledging their importance, exploring the mechanisms that may
effectively promote productive coordination in other areas may provide lessons
that will help making the enforcement of the Clean Company Act more effective.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the Brazilian anti-corruption
system has created a mechanism that has been particularly useful in enhancing
institutional coordination and cooperation—the National Strategy to Combat
Corruption and Money Laundering (Estratégia Nacional de Combate a Corrupção
e Lavagem de Dinheiro) (“ENCCLA”). Created in 2003 via Presidential Decree
and located at the Ministry of Justice, the ENCCLA was an attempt to coordinate
the efforts of three branches of government, the Public Prosecutors’ Office, and
civil society to fight money laundering. After making significant progress in this
area, its mandate was expanded in 2006 to include corruption, changing the
name from “ENCLA” to “ENCCLA.” The ENCCLA promotes the exchange
of information, fosters strategic cooperation among different institutions, and
pushes for legislative and institutional reforms that can enhance collaboration.215
While the ENCCLA has been able to promote a great deal of cooperation at
the strategic level, it has encountered barriers to do the same at the operational
level.216 In sum, how to effectively foster inter-institutional collaboration in an
environment of institutional multiplicity is a topic that certainly deserves more
attention, especially by those concerned with the effective enforcement of the
Clean Company Act.
If it is not possible to adopt robust efforts to improve coordination, there are
reasons to support the idea that inter-institutional communication should at least
avoid destructive or uncooperative behaviour. For example, while the relationship
between the MPF and DPF and other investigative bodies can be collaborative
and complementary, as described in Part II, above, it can also be uncooperative.
Indeed, there are cases in which fierce and unproductive competition between

214. Praça & Taylor, supra note 92 at 27.
215. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15 at 23.
216. See OECD Working Group (2010), supra note 26.
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the two institutions has undermined overall investigative efforts.217 Institutional
multiplicity may also create coordination problems, and it may increase the
risk of some actors undermining the functions performed by others. Thus, if
malleable coordination such as that promoted under the ECCO and ENCCLA is
not possible, trying to avoid uncooperative and destructive behaviour may at least
increase the chances of institutional multiplicity generating positive outcomes.
It is important to note that a large portion of the advances achieved in Brazil
in general, and by the ENCCLA in particular, are due to the fact that specialized
departments to combat money laundering and fight corruption have been
created within the DPF, MPF, the Ministry of Justice, and other institutions.
Perhaps the clearest example of the advantages of specialization comes from the
creation of specialized judicial benches (varas especializadas), discussed in Part
II(A), above. Specialized judges seem to be able to process cases much faster than
generalist judges, who are often unfamiliar with the complicated laws governing
money laundering. This initiative is often cited as an example of success218 and
suggests that the enforcement of the Clean Company Act could also benefit from
some level of specialization. However, it is hard to determine to what extent
the specialization in the judiciary alone is the sole factor that can possibly
explained expedited decisions. Confounding variables include the specialization
in the DPF and MPF (which may have generated claims based on more robust
evidence) and a legislative change in 1998 that defined money laundering as a
stand-alone crime, rather than being defined in connection to a pre-defined list
of criminal activities.219
Based on the perceived success of the money laundering initiative, the
ENCCLA is currently advocating for the creation of specialized judicial benches
for corruption cases.220 While this may be a promising development, it is important
to note that such initiatives may be more likely to generate positive outcomes
if they are structured as an option to the existing system, not a replacement
of it. The separate judiciary created in Indonesia to analyze corruption cases,
discussed in Part I(B), above, may be an interesting experiment to be explored in
the Brazilian context. More specifically, it may suggest that there are advantages
to specialization, but these are only likely to be promising if they do not exclude
217. RG Azevedo & FB Vasconcellos, “O inquérito policial em questão: situação atual e a
percepção dos delegados de polícia sobre as fragilidades do modelo Brasileiro de investigação
criminal” (2011) 26:1 Sociedade e Estado 59; Melo, supra note 127 at 29.
218. Ibid.
219. Lei nº 9.613, de 3.3.1998.
220. Prado & Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption,” supra note 15 at 24.
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attempts to promote institutional multiplicity (i.e., if there is a choice to bring the
case to a specialized court or not). In other words, there needs to be malleability
in specialization as well.
As discussed in Part II(A), above, institutional multiplicity may generate
alternative avenues to perform the accountability functions of oversight,
investigation, and punishment, but it may also create problems. Both
coordination and specialization may be undermined by institutional multiplicity,
but this does not necessarily need to be the case. Indeed, Brazil provides a few
examples of initiatives in which malleability has been used, and institutional
multiplicity, coordination, and specialization were successfully reconciled to
produce promising results. These lessons can and should be easily applied to the
enforcement of the Clean Company Act to make it more effective.

IV. CONCLUSION
Three types of legal punishment can be imposed on someone engaged in
corruption in Brazil: administrative, civil, and criminal. Each is determined by
separate judicial or administrative processes that operate independently of one
another.221 The institutional multiplicity argument suggests that independence
of the processes might be positive: If one process is flawed, another may be able
to compensate. As argued in this article, the new Brazilian Clean Company Act
seems to rely largely on institutional multiplicity to enforce sanctions against
companies involved in corrupt practices in Brazil and abroad. Our hypothesis
is that this may help the Act overcome some of the obstacles often encountered
in efforts to effectively punish corrupt practices in Brazil. There are, however,
no guarantees that institutional multiplicity will generate the benefits identified
in this article. Indeed, it may actually generate inefficiencies with institutional
duplication, destructive competition, and obstacles to cooperation and
coordination. Whether the Clean Company Act will prove to be a positive or a
negative example of institutional multiplicity remains to be seen.

221. Lei nº 8.112, de 11.12.1990, art 125.

